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ABSTRACT
This thesis discusses the use of the Rhine River by Juiius Caesar in his 
commentaries, De Bello Gallico, covering the Gallic Wars of approximately 58 to 52 
B.C., to identify the peoples and territories separated by its current. This thesis addresses 
the issue of how Caesar understood this division of space, what criteria he employed to 
support his use of the river, and his portrayal of these matters within his account. It seeks 
to clarify the foundation of a major national border of western history in the context of its 
initial involvement in the context of the Roman Late Republic.
This thesis approaches the question of Caesar’s use of the Rhine from a literary 
perspective. It places an emphasis on contemporary sources and Caesar’s own text, with 
the aim of understanding their rhetorical value as applied to the identification of 
unfamiliar groups and places. It adopts as its principal theoretical framework a model in 
which ideas of identity, civilized customs, and foreign relations operate to clearly 
demarcate areas and communities regardless of specific contacts or military campaigns.
This thesis concludes that, contrary to how such a border is thought of today, the 
Rhine was understood to be an ethnic border after the later campaigns of the Gallic War 
had discredited its original political aspect. First employed to separate those with whom 
Rome had close relations from those with whom it did not, the Rhine evolved both during 
the conflict and in the texts into a cultural divide between groups based on their 




Whether one thinks of war in terms of propaganda or body counts, few wars in 
western history are as infamous as those of Julius Caesar. The Gallic War is particularly 
well known because of Caesar's own account, the De Bello Gallico (BG), which details 
the conflict in seven books (with an eighth written by one of Caesar’s lieutenants). The 
conflict began in 58 B.C. with an influx of Germani into a portion of Gaul inhabited by 
Rome’s allies, and ended in 52 after the end of Gallic resistance to Roman dominion.
The Gallic War extended Rome’s sphere from the Alps and the Rhone to the English 
Channel and the Rhine, entirely incorporated the various Gallic groups, and excluded the 
Germani, who were left on the outside fringe of Rome’s influence. The Rhine River, 
which was of limited significance at least through the first years of the war, would 
become the classic western border of Rome during the Principate and the traditional 
dividing line between Gaul and Germany in western history. These political and 
geographic consequences of Caesar’s proconsulship in Gaul are one reason that the Gallic 
Wars and the BG attract so much attention among western scholars. A second reason is 
the text’s demographic impact. Through his reporting, Julius Caesar established the 
distinctions identifying the inhabitants on either side of the Rhine River.
This paper examines the BG to determine the principal stages of development in 
Julius Caesar’s Rhine policy and its ethnographic impact. The Rhine River acted first as
1
a political barrier between communities and evolved into an ethnic dividing line, 
juxtaposing Callus and Gemtanus. This becomes evident when Book One is compared 
to the text's later books. As Caesar’s military goals changed, the function of the Rhine 
expanded as an element in dealing with his opponents. Caesar's differentiation between 
the Galli and the Germani, the criteria used, and the power relationships represented all 
evolve throughout the text. This thesis will argue that the roles of both the boundary and 
the ethnic distinctions originated in a relatively limited, politically difficult campaign 
along Rome’s immediate frontier. The evolution began when Caesar returned to the 
Rhine in 55 B.C. during a later phase of the conflict and with new, if similar, goals. In 
short, this paper will argue that Julius Caesar used the Rhine River as a political rather 
than a strictly geographic border to both understand and identify Rome’s new frontier 
zone and its inhabitants. This is a study in perception, identification, and the 
objectification of ethnicity within an evolving military and political context.
The BG is the earliest extant text that provides any rationale for limiting Rome’s 
dominion to the Rhine. There seems no reason to presume that the Rhine was ever a 
natural border. Indeed, archaeological studies and traditional historiography have both 
consistently noted the porous nature of the border -  the natives on either side had 
traditions of migration and contact, while Roman commanders, including Caesar, crossed 
the river in several campaigns well into the first century A.D.1 2 Yet, the overall consensus 
of the textual sources is that Germania was not subject to Rome in the fashion that its
1 Both archaeological and philological investigations have demonstrated that the river was neither a cultural 
nor an ethnic divide. See Malcolm Todd, The Northern Barbarians 100 BC -  AD 300 (London:
Hutchinson & Co. Ltd, 1975), 19-29, 45, footnote 53; Susan P. Mattern, Rome and the Enemy: Imperial 
Strategy in the Principate (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 76, footnote 176; Barry 
Cunliffe, The Oxford Illustrated Prehistory of Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 428.
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provinces, such as Gaul, were. Rome’s traditional enemies, the peoples stressed in 
speeches and artwork, were largely Gallic during the Republican period, but Germanic in 
the Imperial. Thus, as the first text to record the evolution of west-central Europe and its 
inhabitants in Roman perception, and one of few documents focused on provincial 
matters during the Late Republic (c. 80-27 B.C.), the BG provides vital testimony as to 
how the Romans organized their world.
This thesis views the text as a conscious argument by Caesar, made in a political 
context, and therefore relevant to both his perceptions and his goals. While this approach 
evades the question of the BG’s historicity and the objective course of the Gallic War, the 
broader context requires explanation. One cannot employ the BG as a source without 
taking a position on a number of related issues. This study’s argument is fundamentally 
dependent on the content of the text coevolving with contemporary events. It is thus 
inextricably linked to the theory of periodic composition, which assumes that the BG was 
not originally composed as a unitary text after Caesar’s victory but book-by-book over 
the duration of the conflict. This theory, which will be discussed in detail below, has 
always had adherents among scholars but has possessed the burden of proof since all 
extant manuscripts are finished copies. The theory of periodic composition better 
explains the evolution that this study observes within the text than competing theories, so 
it is adopted. To reflect this perspective, the plurality of Caesar’s campaigns will be 
stressed, as both his theatre and his opponents ranged broadly during the conflict, the 
Gallic Wars. To tie this paper into a broader theoretical framework, a discussion of some 
essential matters of the modern historiography follows.
The Subject -  A Difficult War
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The Gallic Wars took place at an awkward juncture in the context of Roman 
imperialism. A period of civil war had ended with Sulla’s victory decades earlier, 
Rome’s attention remained on the Mediterranean and Pompey’s eastern dispositions, and 
the (now obvious) rivalries within Rome had not yet exploded into a second period of 
civil war. The Gallic Wars also sit astride opposing trends related to v< different 
sociopolitical periods and prevalent structures, namely the Republic with its aristocratic 
competition and the Principate with its imperial centrality.2 3Caesar’s professed motives 
for the Gallic Wars suggest the oldeu traditional view of Roman imperialism that 
emphasized a reluctance to provoke battle or take territory, but a determination to defend 
existing positions.' Yet Caesar’s own accounts aslo imply an openly imperialistic 
mindset, one driven by desire for personal glory, material wealth, and political control.4 
There is also the geopolitical factor behind the war, that it was sparked by a threat to 
Rome’s dominion, but pursued haphazardly due to the independent decisions of Caesar, 
including whom to fight and where, rather than being waged with any consistent strategy
2 The transition is typically but not always characterized as a revolution and had several dimensions. See 
Ronald Syme, The Roman Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939) for a predominantly social 
perspective of this change, in which new classes from Italy replace the old Roman elite with new values 
and interests; P. A. Brunt, The Fall of the Roman Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) for a political 
argument, in which the Italians are viewed as the same classes as in Rome, and thus only the membership is 
new; Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, “Mutatio Morum: The Idea of a Cultural Revolution,” in The Roman 
Cultural Revolution, ed. Thomas Habinek and Alessandro Schiesaro (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998); Christine Meier, Caesar, transl. David McLintock (New York: BasicBooks, 1982), 491-496.
3 Tenney Frank, Roman Imperialism (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1914); P. W. M. Freeman, 
“Mommsen through to Haverfield: the origins o f Roman studies in late 19th century Britain,” in Dialogues 
in Roman Imperialism: Power, discourse, and discrepant experience in the Roman Empire, ed. D. J. 
Mattingly (Ann Arbor: Cushing-Malloy Inc., 1997). Cf. Sail. Cat., 6; E. Badian, Roman Imperialism in 
the iMte Republic, second edition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968). Ironically, the proponents of 
“defensive imperialism,” especially Frank, viewed the Gallic Wars as Rome’s first truly offensive war.
4 William V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 BC (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1979), 21-26, 98-99; John Rich, “Fear, greed, and glory,” in War and Society in the Roman World 
(London: Routledge, 1993); J. E. Lendon, Empire of Honor (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).
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or oversight from Rome.5 The question, in short, is how to understand what Caesar was 
doing and why. The fact that one of the actors composed the primary account is a 
blessing, in that the rationale provided (discussed in detail in Chapter Two) suggests the 
mentality involved. In the 50’s B.C., Rome’s provinces, the territory directly 
administered by magistrates, were often surrounded by allied or dependent groups. The 
web of these diplomatic, commercial, and military ties extending outward from explicitly 
claimed territory created a frontier zone. The inhabitants of the frontier zone were social 
and political intermediaries, distinct from both those under Rome’s direct administration 
and those living outside.6 This concept of the frontier zone best accounts for the goals 
Caesar professes and the actions he takes, as the migration of peoples into this region 
attracted his involvement due to the threat of upsetting existing relationships. The 
creation and later modification of Caesar’s Rhine policy was to protect the prestige, 
treaties, and the goods that flowed between Roman territory and those within the frontier.
Employing the concept of the frontier zone, the relevant portions of conflict can 
be described as follows. In his campaign against the chieftain Ariovistus (58 B.C.), 
Caesar insisted upon the Rhine as the boundary not to be crossed by Ariovistus’ 
followers, the Germani. The Rhine was at that point the territorial limit of the Sequani, 
for whom Caesar was acting as a patron. By using the Rhine to settle the smaller dispute, 
Caesar enclosed Gaul, completing a geographical region. His use of the Rhine also
5 J. S. Richardson, Hispaniae: Spain and the Development of Roman Imperialism, 218-82B C. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986); Arthur M. Eckstein, Senate and General: Individual Decision-making 
and Roman Foreign Relations, 264-194 B.C. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
6 Stephen L. Dyson, The Creation of the Roman Frontier (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).
At first glance, this may seem a clarification o f the defensive imperialism model, but it is far more complex 
as the frontier involves a mutual interchange between cultures and practices. For the army’s role in the 
creation o f this provincial class, see N. J. E. Austin and N. B. Rankov, Exploratorio: Military and 
Political Intelligence in the Roman World (London: Routledge, 1995), 91-102.
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identified • olkical territory and, sir.ee members of communities that benefited from a 
Roman patron were themselves defined as clients of that person, created the expectation 
of ethnic identity. The Rhine separated the “other” both implicitly and explicitly’, 
because Caesar’s policy was not to permit any Germanus (a non-Gallus, a non-member 
of the communities within the frontier zone) into Gaul.7 As the Gallic Wars progressed, 
the frontier zone became enlarged, and Caesar campaigned on a wider basis. His activity 
ranged to the Atlantic coast, along the way encountering hybridized peoples such as the 
Eelgae and the Treveri, who lived as Galli but claimed Germanic lineage.
Beginning with the arrival of more Germanic immigrants, Caesar campaigned 
among these mixed peoples and the river for a sustained period (55 to 53 B.C.). Like 
Ariovistus before them, these new immigrants had no place within the frontier zone, but 
the presence of peoples who claimed to have been Germani within the expanded frontier 
questioned the old ethnic standard. Ultimately, Caesar distinguished the hybrids from the 
newcomers by emphasizing their differences from the Germani and similarities to the 
Galli within the initial frontier zone. Their right to exist within Gaul was demonstrated 
by their Gallic way of life (in Roman terms, their humanitas and mores), which could be 
incorporated into the new frontier. In other words, upon the conclusion of this second 
phase (55 to 53), the Rhine no longer divided political units in terms of friends and
7 The Roman concept of the “other” is difficult to identify, and one is often forced to retreat to a generic 
perception o f not-like-us. As this paper operates within a framework that assumes some degree of social, 
political, and cultural ties among its subjects, and especially a Roman perception of familiarity of way of 
life, a definition of otherness can be attempted. An “other” was any group lacking in or of unknown quality 
regarding the relationships typical o f the Roman world, such as membership in a recognized polity, client 
to a known patron, or willingness to pursue either. These relationships will be discussed more fully in 
Chapter Three, and draw upon the analysis o f Roman ideas o f civilization and identity as discussed in Greg 
Woolf, Becoming Roman: The Origins of Provincial Civilization in Gaul (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 1-23.
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enemies, but rather ethnicities in terms of civilization. This outline based on a frontier
concept will frame the narrative of this paper.
As this study relies overwhelmingly upon a single text, the nature of the document 
deserves examination. The value of the BG is its first-hand testimony, as Caesar was an 
observer for most of the conflict. This characteristic of the text makes it something of a 
rarity, given that so few ancient sources generally survive or remain intact, with even 
fewer by their own subjects. Unfortunately, these qualities are not entirely positive.
Julius Caesar was the author, main actor, and the editor of the BG, at least regarding its 
content. The main purpose of the BG was to inform the Roman Senate, and as many 
prominent men as possible, of Caesar’s activities. The text served Caesar’s own political 
and class interests by promoting his reputation and strengthening his political position. 
Caesar did not write as a detached observer but as an active participant in public affairs, 
and the extant text likely originated in annual dispatches to Rome. The final form of an 
edited, published text provided pro-Caesar source material for those who would write 
histories and maintain Caesar’s reputation through the ages. The text was composed 
neither to deceive nor to provide an objective account, but to support Caesar’s own 
perceptions of events and arguments for his actions.8
The commentary, the genre of Roman literature of which the BG is an example, 
has no modern equivalent but shares the characteristics of both a political autobiography 
and a field report. In one of his letters, Cicero remarks: “An autobiographer must needs *7
8 For an introduction to Julius Caesar as an author, see R. M. Ogilvie, “Caesar,” in The Cambridge History 
of Classical Literature, volume two, Latin Literature, ed. E. J. Kenney (Cambridge: Cambrige Univeristy 
Press, 1982), 283-285. For a discussion of the BG’s place in the context o f literary history, see Christina S. 
Kraus, “Forging a national identity: Prose literature down to the time of Augustus,” in Literature in the 
Greek and Roman Worlds, ed. Oliver Taplin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 311-335.
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write over-modestly where praise is due and pass over anything that calls for censure. 
Moreover, his credit and authority are less, and many will blame him and say that heralds 
at athletic contests show more delicacy.”9 Cicero’s opinion testifies to the intellectual 
environment in which the BG was written, delivered, and viewed. The Romans would 
have expected some omissions or glosses that modern readers may find unfortunate, or 
even unacceptable. As such, how one judges the BG as a source will determine not only 
how one works with its content, but what types of questions may be dealt with. This 
thesis is not primarily concerned with the text’s level of objective truth, but rather its 
political commentary. This subjective focus derives from a long-term trend in modern 
scholarship, one that has moved increasingly to accept Cicero’s opinion as a valid one.
Modem Commentators -  Finding the Fiction 
As suggested above, the Gallic Wars occurred at a difficult time within the 
chronology of the Roman world. Julius Caesar was in many respects the fulcrum for the 
transformation from Republic to Empire. As such, it is not unknown to view his life, 
career, and adventures in Gaul, not to mention the Rhine River itself, with a hindsight 
burdened by the existence of the Principate. Modern analysis finds the transformation 
deeply engrained in the Late Republic and thus tends to assume the process inevitable. 
Caesar and the Gallic Wars become a step in a master plan to obtain resources or gain 
power. Scholars effectively confuse the consequences of Caesar’s actions for his 
motivations. Indeed, the Gallic Wars are rarely a focus of study themselves despite the 
existence of a detailed account. The conflict is instead famous for when it occurred and 
who engineered it. 8
9 Cic. Fam., 5.12, transl. D. R. Shackleton Bailey, New York, 1986.
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The key pioneer of Roman historiography was Theodore Mommsen, who heid an 
exalted view of Caesar, but less so of the Gallic Wars. As the founder of the now- 
outmoded idea of defensive imperialism, he had to differentiate between the man and the 
conflict more than has since become common. In doing so, he maintained a position that 
soon dropped out of fashion: “It is more than an error, it is an outrage upon the sacred 
spirit dominant in history, to regard Gaul solely as the parade ground on which Caesar 
exercised himself and his legions for the impending Civil War.’’10 1Perhaps not 
unexpectedly, the BG itself suggests this. Its first three books not only record 
overwhelmingly successful campaigns, but also a Roman proconsul seemingly (and 
perhaps apologetically) out of position to capitalize upon them." Granting the text’s 
rhetoric, the value of such testimony is largely dependent upon the likelihood of periodic 
composition, an idea that took time to achieve acceptance.
Interpretations of the Gallic Wars generally revolve around perceptions of Caesar, 
and twentieth-century scholarship has largely split along national lines.12 English 
scholars tend to be sympathetic, emphasizing Caesar’s good qualities and casting the 
Gallic Wars as a historically progressive conflict. French scholars emphasize Caesar’s 
personal interests and denigrate both the BG and the conflict it records as manifestations
10 Theodore Mommsen, The History of Rome, transl. Reverend William P. Dickson, volume 3 (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1885), 257.
11 One aspect o f Caesar’s decisions in the first few books of the BG that receives little attention was his 
attempts to leave central Gaul (not technically one of his provinces) for Illyricum (explicitly his 
responsibility). Illyrian tribes had been causing trouble through piracy since at least the second century. 
Several scholars have suggested, probably correctly, that Caesar expected to make his fortune in Illyricum 
from the beginning. Caesar had a tendency to assume that each spectacular victory had eliminated 
resistance. Caes. B Gall., 2 .7 ,2 .35, 3.1,5.1. Even if one argues that any battlefield would fit into a 
proposed “program,” the tone o f the passages suggests that Caesar was most sensitive to not fulfilling his 
prescribed duties as proconsul in the provinces.
12 These perceptions are often buried in the dialogue o f imperialism. See A. N. Sherwin-White, “Caesar as 
an Imperialist,” Greece & Rome (March, 1957), 36-45. Perhaps submitting himself to this observation, 
Sherwin-White argues (almost exclusively from the BG itself) that Caesar was not a particularly aggressive 
(or ambitious) imperialist.
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of ambition. They tend to assume actual deception. German scholars focus most 
specifically upon Caesar, tending to cast him in the role of enlightened (or at least 
capable) autocrat both governing and governed by events. Overall, whereas Mommsen 
and contemporaries treated the BG in almost Boolean terms, the scholarly trend has been 
away from what Caesar described and towards how he described it.
The English historian T. Rice Holmes is perhaps the most distinguished 
commentator on the BG, and he is certainly the scholar with whom to disagree. Almost 
as literal-minded in his approach as Mommsen, Holmes argued for the text’s overall 
reliability and general accuracy (if not total precision), especially in terms of geographic 
detail, lack of inconsistency, and general credibility.13 Holmes’ point of view remained 
dominant for decades, encouraging many scholars to use the BG freely as an archival or 
private source document without engaging its public nature. For Holmes, the validity of 
the Rhine border was based on a broadly correct inteipretation of the pre-Roman state of 
Gallic and Germanic settlement and not an arbitrary creation of Caesar. Holmes also 
defended the integrity and basic objectivity of the narrative from aggressive French 
“sciolists,” as some island scholars labeled their continental counterparts, who felt free to 
“correct” the BG when it made mistakes.14 At this stage of scholarship, attention 
remained concentrated on the accuracy of Caesar’s topographical descriptions while
13 T. Rice Holmes, Caesar’s Conquest of Gaul, second edition (New York: AMS Press, 1971). Holmes 
provides the most recent full commentary (first edition 1899, second edition 1911, with reprints). Now 
accepted as unduly literal partly to his use o f in-text proofs to settle disputes about the material, Holmes 
himself merely claimed a minimal amount of distortion, not a total absence of it.
14 T. Rice Holmes, “Signor Ferrero’s Reconstruction of Caesar’s First Commentary,” The Classical 
Quarterly (July, 1909), 203-215; T. Rice Holmes, “Signor Ferrero or Caesar?,” The Classical Quarterly 
(October, 1910), 239-246; F. Haverfield, Review o f Caesar's Conquest of Gaul, by T. Rice Holmes, The 
Classical Review (December, 1911), 257-258. “Sciolist” is Haverfield’s term and is essentially an 
accusation of superficial quality of work paired with a haughtiness of manner, as if the French believed that 
they had discovered the true meaning of the text and others were merely imaginative children.
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philology tested ethnographic divisions. A political aspect was assumed, but kept 
separate from the narrated events. Like Mommsen and major commentators before him. 
Holmes argued that Caesar produced the BG as one text, therefore limiting its propaganda 
content. The argument was that Caesar composed and published the BG on the eve of the 
civil war (c. 51-49 B.C.), so while it was definitely pro-Caesar, there could be little 
development in material (such as the character of one of his lieutenants) from book to 
book. Overall, from Mommsen to Holmes and many of their respondents, the SG’s 
narrative largely overshadowed its rhetorical content.
While English scholars accused their French counterparts of being superficial and 
too eager to attack, one French scholar, Michel Rambaud, offered a key challenge to the 
dominant approach to the BG.' ' He addressed the “compiled” nature of the extant text. 
Since its original composition and publication had a direct impact on Caesar’s ability to 
control the perceptions of his contemporaries, Rambaud argued for a systematic process 
by which annual dispatches become steadily reworked into an edited narrative, which 
“appeared” on the eve of the civil war. This late date of publication was not 
controversial, but Rambaud’s suggestion that the annual dispatches had smoothly and 
steadily streamed out of Gaul as part of a deliberate public relations effort was. Where 
Holmes championed the BG's essential truthfulness, Rambaud adopted the opposite 
extreme. The text became essentially suspicious because of Caesar’s (assumed) control 
over the flow of information. While he emphasized the public nature of the text,
1 5 Michel Rambaud, L ’Art De Im  Deformation Historique Dans Les Commentaires De Cesar (Paris: les 
Belles letters, 1956); E. T. Salmon. Review o f L ’Art De La Deformation Historique Dans Les 
Commentaires De Cesar, by Michel Rambaud, American Journal of Philology (1955), 201-203; J. F. 
Gilliam, Review o f L ’Art De La Deformation Historique Dans Les Commentaires De Cesar, by Michel 
Rambaud, American Historical Review (April, 1956), 614-615.
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Rambaud identified it as neither journal nor status report, but strictly as a public relations 
piece.
Another school, largely German, approached the BG as a source to understand its 
author, seeing the BG as a means of investigating Caesar’s thoughts and intentions since, 
fact or propaganda, the text certainly advanced Caesar’s own point of view. Matthias 
Gelzer advocated an image of Caesar as a purely political animal, whose constant interest 
was in solidifying his own advancement in Roman public life, whether through popular 
politics, military success, or prestige as successful literati.16 For Gelzer, the Gallic Wars 
were not part of a cohesive plan, but rather the outcome of Caesar’s skill at manipulating 
events to serve his interests. This perspective moves the BG from being either a neutral 
by-the-numbers account or an inherently skewed source of information to one which has 
strong elements of both but which is not exclusively either. Another scholar, Christian 
Meier, one of the most influential modern biographers of Caesar, utilized the same 
approach.17 Because the text indicates the habits and ideas of its author within the 
context of Roman politics, he treated the BG as a journal. This treatment placed the BG 
entirely in the biographical realm, despite acknowledgement of its public aspect. The 
approach taken by this school evades questions of composition and acknowledges the 
text’s public nature, but has the unique disadvantage of tying the BG too closely to the 
personality of Caesar, leaving the narrated events in the shadows.
To varying degrees, scholars have treated the BG as an either-or matter. Either 
Caesar reported with basic accuracy or he did not. Recently, however, the text, its
16 Matthias Gelzer, Caesar: Politician and Statesman, transl. Peter Needham (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1968).
17 Christian Meier, Caesar, transl. David McLintock (NewYork: BasicBooks, 1995).
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reliability, and its publication have all come under reexamination. The best example of 
this was a 1996 seminar, “Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter,” that produced a collection of 
papers focused on basic questions about the text and its portrayal of events. The 
seminar’s puipose also included an explicit departure from the polar position exemplified 
by Holmes and Rambaud, while pursuing the text’s presentation and composition as the 
key foci. The collected papers generally approached the document from a literary 
standpoint, finding meaning in narrative structure, Caesar’s choice of emphasis, and 
similar characteristics relevant to a rhetorical document.* 19 The seminarians also, 
although not without exception, renewed the challenge Rambaud had earlier raised 
regarding the single composition thesis, although eschewing his propagandistic 
interpretation of the BG. The seminar’s underlying assumption, that how Caesar narrated 
had as much meaning and purpose as what he narrated, is shared by this study.
The Text -  A Case For Periodic Composition 
The importance of periodic composition to this paper has already been mentioned. 
The idea that each book of the BG was composed individually and later compiled into an 
edited, published whole deserves additional discussion because the argument of this study 
relies upon the development of the text itself. The development of ethnic distinctions 
based on the political consequences of an earlier Rhine policy cannot be maintained, as 
this study will attempt to do, if the BG consisted only of bare outlines or notes until the 
coming of the civil war. In fact, there are several indications that the earlier forms of the
1S Kathryn Welch and Anton Powell, eds., Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as 
Political Instruments (London: Gerald Duckworth and Co., Ltd., 1998).
19 The present historiographic trend in both England and the United States is to employ literary analysis in 
determining the meaning, purpose, and construction o f Caesar’s texts. Andrew M. Riggsby, Review of 
Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as Political Instruments, ed. Kathryn Welch and 
Anton Powell, Bryn Mawr Classical Review (April, 1999).
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text's several books were closer to the finished product and that it was, in effect, 
periodically composed.
One major category of evidence for periodic composition is Caesar’s developing 
literary style. Scholars have long noticed changes in syntax and content as the 
commentaries progress. One philologist who counted specific grammatical constructions 
observed a trend from a legalistic style suitable to a field report in Book One to a much 
more literary style, suggestive of attempts to reach a broader audience, later on, 
especially by Book Four.20 For example, Book Five ends at a dramatic point in the story, 
with the death of an enemy leader. The tendency of the other books, both before and 
after, is to end at the finish of the campaign season. This is interesting because Books 
Five and Six narrate a continuous campaign during the middle of a winter (54/53 B.C.), 
which saw a major revolt along the Rhine. It is possible that this break exists because of 
editing concerns in the final edition, such as book length or dramatic impact. One scholar 
suggests, however, that such a change can also mean that Caesar deliberately manipulated 
his narrative in the field, still recording the facts but weighting them to his benefit by 
inserting a pause into a difficult campaign to suggest his ongoing success.21 One grave 
danger to Rome’s assets becomes two lesser ones, at least within the perceptions of his 
audience, and two prominent successes. This makes Caesar’s position seem less 
precarious and the text seem more adventurous, which may indicate a larger prospective 
audience. The suggestion is also intriguing because the deliberate use of the drama of the
20 J. J. Schlicher, “The Development of Caesar’s Narrative Style,” Classical Philology (July, 1936), 212- 
224. Schlicher suggests that the change was partly motivated by the glamour and adventure inherent in 
Caesar’s expedition to Britain.
T. P. Wiseman, “The Publication of the De Bello Galileo,” in Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter: The War 
Commentaries as Political Instruments, ed. Welch and Anton Powell (London: Gerald Duckworth and Co., 
Ltd., 1998).
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leader’s death emphasizes an increasing bent for complexity characteristic of a 
developing style.
The other traditional support for periodic publication stems from inconsistencies 
of content, such as apparent confusion between two groups at one point followed by 
greater detail (and differentiation) in later books. This evidence, although rejected by 
those like Holmes who found it unconvincing, was nonetheless used to support broader 
interpretations of the text, including its purpose.22 Caesar’s commentaries do not betray 
the type of third person omniscience common to after-the-fact narratives when the author 
already knows the full consequences of an actor’s actions. This is most true regarding the 
new people who had upset the status quo by crossing the Rhine. The changing face of the 
Gerinani is a clear example of developing content, one that can most readily be accounted 
for by the theory of periodic composition.
The modem concept of ethnicity does not, strictly speaking, have an equivalent in 
the BG, although the standards of differentiation Caesar employed may be compatible.
As will be discussed in Chapter Two, the Romans tended to conflate peoples and their 
territory, especially if either were unfamiliar to them. Furthermore, as will be discussed 
in Chapter Three, markers of identity were in fact political (membership in a civitas) or 
“racial” (,gens -  in terms of physical stock like a breeding group or lineage). If the BG 
was composed at one particular time, then one would not only expect Caesar’s use of the 
Rhine to be consistent, but that the Germani (the people) and Germania (their land) 
would appear at the same point in the text -  just as Gaul and its inhabitants do. This is *15
22 Norman J. DeWitt, “The Non-Political Nature o f Caesar’s Commentaries,” Transactions and 
Proceedings of the American Philological Association (1942), 341-352. DeWitt’s view is in many ways 
outdated, as his argument that “there is no need whatever to regard them as political literature” is simplistic. 
His information on the BG's genre and inconsistencies is stronger.
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not the case. The Germani appear in Book One of the BG as the followers of Ariovistus. 
Their relationship to Rome and the G Mi is an extension of their leader’s and their 
identity is dependent upon this relit; iship. Caesar describes their whereabouts in 
relation to Gaul, with verbs denou movement or location, such as transire (“to cross 
over”) and incolere (“to live (in k occupy”), or a construction combining locus and esse 
(“to be in a place”)."3 Treatment of the territory of these new people does not begin until 
the description of the Usipete md Tencteri in Book Four, but the focus remains 
predominantly on the people not their land.* 24 The first clear articulation of a Germania in 
a strictly geographic sense in the BG occurs during a brief geographic description of the 
mysterious isle of Britain.25 Once the narrative arrives at the revolt of 53 B.C., Caesar 
speaks of the territo nuch more freely. For example, the ethnographic section of Book 
Six is not just a description of the habits and customs of peoples, but also oddities like 
animals that exL within the actual land boundaries.26
The re' dt of Caesar’s first three years was to set the boundaries of a limited, 
familiar Gam, one in which Rome had already established its diplomatic position and 
which Ariovistus had threatned by continuing to transgress the Rhine. As he campaigned 
along the Lower Rhine the next few years, Caesar found himself dealing with the
2J Some examples: (2.4) “plerosque Belgos esse ortos a Germanis Rhenumque antiquitus traductos (“most 
of the Belgians were of German origin and had crossed the Rhine in ancient times”)”; (4.7) “in locis esse 
Germanos audiebat (“he was listening to the Germani at that place”)”; (4.16) “ad ultimas Germanorum 
nations (“to the limits of the nations of the Germani”)”.
24 Caes. B Gall., 4.4: “rnultis locis Germaniae triennium vagati ad Rhenum pervenerunt (“they happened 
upon the Rhine after roaming for three years throughout Germania”).” Caesar’s choice o f pervenio appears 
to be an example of his downplaying the arrival of the Usipetes and Tencteri, as it has a haphazard sense. 
The effect is to weaken the idea of a land of the Germani, and even the concept of Germania is fragmented.
25 Caes. B Gall., 5.13.
26 Caes. B Gall., 6.11: “[l]t seems not inappropriate to give an account of the customs of Gaul and 
German[ia] and the differences between these two nations.” The BG says Galliae Germaniaeque, not 
Gallorum et Germanorum. This has the tidy effect of passing over possible difficulties such as where the 
Treveri or Belgae fit into the schematic by speaking in terms of regions instead of ethnic groups.
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Germani (or their potential presence) more frequently, as well as peoples within Gaul 
who claimed Germanic descent or did not live entirely in a familiar fashion.' It is 
understandable that Caesar would trace his path through Gaul in the narrative of the BG 
regardless of when he composed the text. That the concept of a distinct land beyond 
Gaul would follow the identification of newcomers within Gaul as its (former) 
inhabitants suggests less knowledge about the land and newcomers at one point in the 
text than another. In other words, the apparent lack of omniscience strongly implies 
periodic composition.
This Study -  Method and Sources
This thesis will argue that a conflict upon the Roman frontier in 58 B.C. resulted 
in Julius Caesar adopting the Rhine River as a political and geographic boundary for 
Gaul. It will further indicate how Caesar employed the Rhine and other criteria to draw a 
sharp ethnographic distinction between the Galli and the Germani in the effort to create 
and maintain a new frontier. This argument assumes that each book of the BG was 
written soon after the events it describes and prior to the following one. Some basic 
accuracy in narration is likewise assumed, but the BG will largely be held to its own 
standard as a public text with its own argument. For the purposes of this paper, the 
validity of Caesar’s claims do not rely on whether the Galli were actually physically, 
linguistically, ethnically, racially, or nationally distinct from the Germani. They rely on 27
27 It has been suggested that Caesar’s formulation o f the Germanic identity (beyond existing stereotypes) 
was adopted by people as much as impressed upon them. If so, then Caesar’s rhetoric not only offered his 
Roman audience a framework for northern geography, but also created a foundation for a future Gallo- 
Roman identity that seized upon the Rhine as a rallying point. Nico Roymans, “Romanization, Cultural 
Identity and the Ethnic Discussion, The Integration o f the Lower Rhine Populations in the Roman Empire,” 
in Integration in the Early Roman West: The Role of Culture and Ideology, ed. Jeannet Metzler, Martin 
Millet, Nico Roymans, Jan Slofstra (Luxembourg: Musee National d’Histoire et d’Art, 1993), 47-64.
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the identifiers and reasons he presents because these factors, the basis of his perception, 
would through the BG have the most authority and influence in the Roman world.
The BG is, of course, this study’s main source. Most auxiliary source material 
comes from Cicero, whose letters and speeches not only have the virtue of being 
contemporary but of a similar rhetorical type as the BG. Furthermore, Cicero was not 
only of the same class, status, literary accomplishment, and influence as Caesar himself, 
but Cicero’s brother Quintus served as one of Caesar’s legati. Given that Cicero and 
Quintus exchanged letters during the conflict, he thus offers a useful standard to 
determine the communication, effect, and typicality of Caesar’s information. Additional 
primary sources are limited. The literary nature of the questions posed reduces the utility 
of many traditional used sources for studying the Late Republic. Most literary sources 
detailing the conflict ultimately derive from the BG limiting their usefulness for this 
paper.
Reservations aside, a number of outside texts have their benefits. Given that part 
of the argument is geographic, Strabo, the nearest and most complete geographer to the 
Gallic Wars, provides some useful source material. There is some question whether 
Strabo used the BG (he does not mention Caesar as a source), but he did have information 
about Germania due to imperial campaigns seventy years after the Gallic Wars.28 In 
addition, Strabo’s archival materials included Posidonius, now a lost source, who visited
28 Strabo Geogr., 7.1.9. The border did move beyond the Rhine and at least one Germanic group, the Ubii, 
were allowed into Gaul during imperial times. This resulted in the creation o f two provinces of Germania 
on the eastern side o f the Rhine, an act significant for imperial administration, but less so for the continuity 
of the border itself. Strabo Geogr., 4.1.2-4.3.4; Woolf, Becoming Roman, The Origins of Provincial 
Civilization in Gaul, 38-40
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Ot)continental Europe decades before Caesar (although he did not travel as far).*" Strabo's 
geography thus offers the best context for the acceptance and strength of Caesar’s own 
claims. Other sources used include Polybius, Sallust, and Appian, mostly for background 
and contextual material. This admittedly limited selection provides a fairly wide 
spectrum of time and perspective, as each dealt with similar themes yet wrote 
successively in relation to Caesar, with Polybius earlier, Sallust within the same period, 
and Appian later. Finally, material sources, inscriptions especially, are comparatively 
few for the period, and, although some notes on archaeology are used for comparative 
putposes, these are not stressed.
This study has two chapters, each with two major sections. Chapter Two, 
“Ancient Gerrymandering,” concentrates on the initial development of Caesar’s Rhine 
policy in 58 B.C. with a specific focus on Book One. This chapter’s first section will 
provide the background and context of the Gallic Wars and the institutional role Caesar 
held. The second component wili follow the second half of Book One, as Caesar justifies 
his conflict with Ariovistus. Chapter Two’s central argument will be that the Rhine 
policy began the process of border creation by demarcating Rome’s hegemonic area and 
discouraging outside interference with the Galli within. Chapter Three, “Separating the 
Right from the Left,” will address the ethnographic aspects of Caesar’s decision, 
including the consequences during the second period of the Gallic Wars which centered 
along the river, in 55 to 53 B.C., with an especial focus on Books Four and Six. Its first 
component will discuss the terminology and social structures that underlay Roman ideas
'9 He was not necessarily the first Greco-Roman explorer o f northern Europe. There is a possibility that 
Pytheas o f Massilia may have traveled around the British Isles in the fourth century B.C. This is 
disputable, however. O. A. W. Dilke, Greek and Roman Maps (London: Thomas & Hudson, Ltd., 1985), 
29-30.
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of civilization and how these applied to Gaul. The second section will consist of Caesar’s 
contrast between the Galli and Germani on the basis of these Roman ideas. Chapter 
Three’s principal argument will be that, having set the Rhine as a political demarcation, 
the river subsequently served as a means of categorizing peoples when new 
circumstances required. Chapter Four will conclude this thesis. Overall, this study 
emphasizes the influence of the BG and its author’s political motives in establishing the 




Few Latin students are unfamiliar with Caesar’s opening lines describing Gaul: 
“The whole of Gaul is divided into three parts, one occupied by the Belgae, another 
occupied by the Acquitani, and the third by those who we call the Galli, but are in their 
own language Celtae. All of these groups differ among themselves in language, customs, 
and laws [lingua, institutes, legibus]”?0 The passage goes on to describe the territorial 
divisions between the three groups, with that of the Galli enclosed by the Rhone, 
Garonne, Atlantic Ocean, the Belgae, and the Rhine.30 1
These lines highlight the political decisions of Rome’s proconsul in Gaul. First, 
the land of the Gauls (Gallia) is divided into three parts, each division hosting a distinct 
people. The Galli are explicitly identified with the Celtae, those in the central portion 
abutting Rome’s northernmost province (also a “Gallia”). The unit is a territory, but its 
pieces are given in terms of their inhabitants. The word omnis, here meaning “in 
entirety” rather than “all of,” is an appositi\ _ indicating the broadest possible use of 
Gallia. The Belgae are not Celtae, and their presence indicates an end to the Celtae’s 
range, yet they inhabit a part of Gaul and so have some claim to being Galli (see Chapter
30 Cues. B Gall., 1.1.
31 The common Latin word for “border,” “territory,” or “country,” especially in Book One, is finis. The 
idea is that the borders enclose a specific space, a territory. Charlton Lewis, ed., A Latin Dictionary 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879). Caesar does not define Gallia as a whole with finis, he separates distinct 
peoples into distinct parts marked by static features.
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Three). In other words, by explicitly identifying the Cellae with the Gaili, Caesar simply 
clarifies the relationship between his theater of operations (Gaul, the whole broad region 
where Gaili of any type roam) and those with whom he is involved (the Celtae, those of 
the central portion whom he will call Gaili). The second sentence indicates what the 
distinctions among these groups are (language, traditions, customs). The text goes on to 
describe the Belgae, the strongest and least commercial of any of those peoples 
mentioned. Caesar most explicitly credits their strength to their habit of fighting the 
Germani, whom he has already identified as trans Rhenum (“across the Rhine”) and at 
the limits of Gallic territory.32 The very first chapter of the first book of the BG has 
already suggested distinctions and offered some rationale for them. As will be argued, 
Book One is very much a deliberate piece of political rhetoric.
This chapter examines Caesar’s campaigns in 58 B.C., first against the Helvetii, 
Gallic migrants, and then against Ariovistus, the leader of Germanic migrants. A specific 
focus on Book One is necessary because it describes the first phase of Caesar’s use of the 
Rhine River. It will be argued that the river became a border between the Gaili and the 
Germani largely in consequence to the behavior of Ariovistus. The behavior the 
Germanic chieftain (rex) in the BG functions in two ways. First, it serves as an apology 
for Caesar due to Ariovistus’ status in relation to Rome. Second, it provides the drama of 
Book One with a colorful villain who embodies undesirable behavior and thus allows 
Caesar to highlight the better behavior of the Gaili. Caesar’s rhetorical case against 
Ariovistus also parallels the establishment of the Rhine in terms of the frontier zone. The 
applicability of this model also necessitates some discussion of the beginning of the war.
32 Caes. B Gall., 1.1.
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Book One’s portrayal of the Galii and Germani, upon which Caesar based his use of the 
Rhine, derives from Caesar’s attempt to maintain Rome’s existing relationships.
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first addresses the context of the 
Gallic Wars, including the events leading up to the conflict and a brief outline of the 
proconsul's sociopolitical role within the frontier. This context emphasizes the political 
terms of Caesar’s initial use of the Rhine by showing the expansion of Roman dominion 
to the river and demonstrating the structures of that dominion. The second part focuses 
more closely on the Rhine and discusses Caesar’s use of the river in relation to the 
rhetorical argument against Ariovistus. In 58 B.C., Caesar was in a position to respond to 
a perceived threat to the frontier and to define and restrict that threat by adopting the 
Rhine as a border. He would be the first Roman to go past the river, but at first sought 
only to prevent others from coming across.33
The purpose of Caesar’s Rhine policy was to prevent mass migrations of peoples 
into the lands of those already secured. As proconsul, Caesar had the responsibility of 
defending the frontier zone, thus maintaining Rome’s social and diplomatic network 
beyond her own territory. If new populations like the Helvetii and Ariovistus’ Germani 
displaced or weakened existing peoples, then the provinces would be exposed to attack, 
financial investments in the provinces would be endangered, and, most importantly, the 
prestige of Rome and the Senate would decline. The Romans tended to treat unfamiliar 
groups as if they were autochthonous, as if they had always lived at their contemporary 
location. In other words, what and who a people were depended upon where they were,
33 App. Gall., 1.5. Appian’s testimony to Caesar being a pioneer does not itself support a meaningful 
distinction between the Galii and Germani. It does indicate that, whoever first described northern Europe, 
Caesar was remembered as having the most authority.
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and vise versa.34 35This made distant lands comprehensible and (as will be discussed in 
Chapter Three) fit into Rome’s own social and diplomatic organization by linking the 
people to the character of their leaders. The security of the frontier zone rested on the 
fides (“trust,” or perhaps “credibility”) of all those involved, as the willingness to respect 
the decisions of the Senate and adhere to treaties removed the need for expensive 
campaigns. Politics was such that not all transgressors were equal. A key difference 
between the Helvetii and the Germani was the recent accommodation between Rome and 
Ariovistus, who Caesar portrays as unduly arrogant. The Helvetii, once defeated, 
respond with appropriate submission. Caesar’s Rhine policy established an ethnic divide 
in 58 B.C. only in that in separated two groups from each other. The significant 
characteristics of those groups were political, essentially relating to how either fit into 
Rome’s sphere of influence. Gallia and the Galli were incorporated, those outside it were 
not. The Rhine would mark the frontier’s expanded area and block a people proven to be 
untrustworthy.
The Gallic Wars -  From the Beginning
The relationship between Roman and Gallus was ancient even in Caesar’s time.33 
Rome fought enemies in every direction throughout her history, but only the north
34 Cic. Scaur., 17.39; Elizabeth Rawson, Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1985), 250-266; Benjamin Isaac, The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity 
(Princeton; Princeton University Press, 2004), 134-137. Much of Rome’s classification of peoples 
depended upon the area they inhabited, with environmental factors or moral habits explaining their abilities 
and behavior. For Gaul, see Charles Ebel, Transalpine Gaul: The Emergence of a Roman Province 
(Lieden: E.J. Brill, 1976), 49-51.
35 Polybius offers the first “comprehensive” descriptions of the Celts, probably by the 150’s B.C., through 
their fighting with Hannibal or in Rome’s Cisalpine, Eastern, or Hispanic wars. Some time in the 80’s, 
Poseidonius traveled through parts of Gallia Comata, but his account survives only in other sources 
(especially Strabo). For all the contact with Gauls within the provinces, little survives that was written 
about them in the intervening years. Nonetheless there is an interesting contrast in that Strabo, who had 
more information than even Caesar, can describe the Gauls at great length, but runs out of material on the 
Germani much more quickly.
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provided an enemy that almost conquered her. Previously known as a plague to the 
Etruscans, the Galli had violently established contact with Rome through the sack of the 
city in the fourth century B.C. This event was so prominent in Roman memory, rhetoric, 
and art that it suggests a new year zero in Rome’s sense of her own history.36 37Later, Galli
served as mercenaries, joining Hannibal in his invasion of Italy during the Second Punic
37War, or fighting against Rome in Spain, Anatolia, and the Balkans. Rome, in turn, 
campaigned heavily in the north, defeating Gallic groups and seizing their territory, 
especially in northern Italy (Cisalpine Gaul). The Germani, however, were relatively 
new, first encountered by Rome roughly sixty years before the Gallic Wars.38 This 
history of animosity has often placed Caesar’s concern for the Rhine in a sympathetic 
light.
Despite continual conflict with them, Rome never had an explicit program to 
conquer the whole of Gaul. Northward expansion was sporadic and the dominion of 
Rome expressed itself through the frontier system. In 121 B.C., by aiding its Greek ally 
Massilia, Rome carved out her northernmost province, Transalpine Gaul, west of the 
Rhone on the southern coast of the continent. This conflict established the frontier zone 
for which Caesar was responsible in 58. It consisted of the province between Hispania 
and the Rhone, the allied city of Massilia securing the eastern flank, a broken enemy, the 
Arverni, to the northwest, and Gallic allies, the Aedui, protecting the north. This system 
precluded intensive campaigns further north by preventing any Gallic group within
36 J. H. C. Williams, Beyond the Rubicon: Romans and Gauls in Rep'd^’ ai\ (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 140-142.
37 H. D. Rankin, Celts and the Classical U nom Helm: Areopagitica Press, 1987), 100.
38 The name German almost identical to a Latin word for “brotherly,” seems to have been of
Gallic origin. Henry H. Howorth, “The Germans o f Caesar,” The English Historical Review (Oxford: 
University Press, 1908), 417-433.
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striking distance from gathering the support necessary to attack the province. There had 
been a handful of campaigns conducted by earlier governors of Transalpine Gaul, but 
Caesar was the first proconsul to face an actual threat to the frontier, with one exception.
The exception consisted of the Cirnbri and Teutoni, who engaged in a mass 
migration into Gaul in the late second century B.C. They are almost universally 
identified as Germani, possibly because of their origin beyond the Rhine, although no 
text describing them predates the BG.i9 They spent nearly a decade harassing the Galli, 
defeating Roman armies, and transgressing allied territory, until finally defeated at the 
threshold of Italy by Caesar’s uncle-in-law Marius in 101 B.C. Scholars both ancient and 
modern have made much of the near recreation of the fourth century invasion.* 40 As will 
be discussed below, the BG often recalls the Cirnbri, especially in Book One, as part of 
Caesar’s justification of attacking Ariovistus.
Despite the near miss of the Cirnbri, the northern frontier remained stable through 
the turmoil of the Social War and the conflict between Marius and Sulla (c. 91-83 B.C.). 
These civil wars, fought respectively over the political rights of Rome’s Italian allies and 
the prestige of commander1- ho championed different approaches to land reform, 
continued to v k the Republic until the early 70’s B.C. Regarding Gaul, Cicero could 
scribe the region c. 69 as the “province of Gaul, which comprises a type of men and 
communities which . . .  have been quite recently subdued by our generals” under the
’9 For details on the Cirnbri, their homeland and ethnicity, see T. Rice Holmes, Caesar's Conquest of Gaul, 
second edition (New York: AMS Press, 1971), 549-553. While modern scholarship, principally 
archaeological, has dealt with the question o f whether the Cirnbri were Gallic or Germanic, the traditional 
arguments remain central. Tacitus is firm that the Cirnbri, who still lived in Jutland during the Flavian 
period, were Germanic. The fact that they entered from “outside” Gaul seems to be the main suppoit of 
their Germanic origin so exact identification is inextricable with Caesar’s paradigm.
40 As one puts it: “The Gafllil were bad enough; but now the conquerors of the Ga[lli] were coming.” 
Philip Van Ness Myers, A History of Rome, second revised edition (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1917),
78.
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“power and dominion of the Roman people” and which hosted “a citizen-colony, which 
stands as a watch-tower and bulwark of the Roman people, and a barrier of defense . .. 
there is also the city of Massilia . .. inhabited by brave and faithful allies, who have 
found in the resources and rewards of the Roman people a recompense for the dangers 
they have run in our Gallic Wars.”41 T hus, despite the near trauma suffered five decades 
earlier, the frontier zone in Gaul was considered secure, without any contact with the 
Rhine.
The concept of the frontier zone implies a level of continual interaction between 
Rome and the inhabitants. Two important ideas characterized Roman attitudes to this 
relationship. The first is that of the terror gallicus, a perceived fear of the Galli due to 
their history of conflict with Rome.42 While the terror gallicus may not have 
characterized the Republic continuously from the sack of Rome or the appearance of the 
Cirnbri, the Romans did have a heightened concern for the northern frontier shortly 
before Caesar’s command. In his rhetoric of 69, Cicero defended the “honor of the 
Roman people” and proclaimed them beyond any mere fear of war.43 Six years later, his 
speeches lacked this sense of superiority. In 63 B.C., the year of Cicero’s consulship,
41 Cic. Font., 5.12-5.13, transl. N. H. Watts, London, 1931. The military language -  watch-tower (specula) 
and bulwark (propugnaculum) -  in relation to the veterans’ colony indicates more than rhetorical flourish. 
It is also a subtle hint that Roman valor had won little more than a fortified camp. The speech was given in 
defense of a Roman governor whose financial practices had upset the neighboring Galli. Cicero expresses 
a confidence in Rome’s position and willingness to maintain it, openly challenging the Galli to take up 
arms. For details on Massilia, see Ebel, Transalpine Gaul, 61, 90-100.
42 Elizabeth Rawson, “Religion and Politics in the Late Second Century B.C. at Rome,” in Roman Culture 
and Society: Collected Papers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 155; Greg W oolf Becoming Roman, The 
Origins o f Provincial Civilization in Gaul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 61. The 
phrase is a modern one, apparently originating in the second century A.D. in an excerpt involving 
Mithradates and his Gallic allies. Just. Epit., 38.4. It has recently been argued that the Gauls were not 
especially feared because they did not threaten Rome’s military or cultural supremacy, as demonstrated by 
their frequent defeats. Cicero nonetheless employs them rhetorically several times, and it may be that the 
so-called terror gallicus (a modern phrase) was stronger outside the aristocratic elite. Isaac, The Invention 
of Racism in Classical Antiquity, 4 11 -426.
43 Cic. Font., 31.49.
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Rome avoided yet another civil war with the failure of the Catilinarian Conspiracy. The 
Allobroges. a Gallic group, had representatives in Rome to approach the Senate regarding 
their debts to Roman creditors. The Catilinarians approached these delegates, but the 
Allobroges exposed the conspiracy. Referring to this connection, Cicero darkly hinted at 
the danger of the Galli in speeches to both the Senate and the citizen assembly, even 
raising the possibility of a general uprising and a possible invasion.44 Caesar was a junior 
member of the Senate during the conspiracy, so his portrayal of the Galli (see below) was 
likely a response to a growing sense of ambiguity regarding them. Such ambiguity would 
make sense if Roman society, or a significant portion of it like the Senate, perceived itself 
vulnerable to foreign disruptions similar to domestic ones like the Catilinarians. The 
Galli inhabited territory close to Rome and her provinces, and they had already invaded, 
twice. Rhetorical bombast or not, the possibility of a third instance may have contributed 
to an increased awareness of the Galli just prior to Caesar’s proconsulship.
Such increased awareness woul i also involve the second important idea of the 
pax deorum (“peace of the gods”). This was the belief that divine favor expressed itself 
in Rome’s strength and prosperity because of proper cult conduct and concern for moral 
order. The dividends of Rome’s empire did not just include military victory, financial 
gain, and unrivalled prestige, but increased poverty, slave revolts, civil wars, and the like. 
The emotional environment created by these results led to a belief in a moral decline or 
loss of tradition that was responsible for these disruptions.45 Like the terror gallicus, the 
pax deorum may have originated as early as the Gallic sack of Rome in the fourth
44 Cic. Cat., 4.4. Cf. Cic. Font., 16.36, 21.49. In 69 B.C., Cicero proudly dares the Galli to offer a 
challenge, while chastising his fellow senators for bowing to threats. In 63, he vehemently insists that a 
war might come and it should be avoided.
45 Sail. Cat., 10-13.
28
century, but the paxdeorum continually remained in Roman thought and rhetoric."6 This 
idea is less important for the political context of the Gallic Wars (the connection between 
religion and civilization will be discussed in Chapter Three), but requires mention 
because it contextualizes the Roman views of autochthony and land ownership that will 
recur throughout this study. The integrity of territory went hand in hand with its 
inhabitants’ right to it.
In the Late Republic -  A New Gaul
Material wealth had a downside, as it could, at least according to Roman 
prejudice, lead to a sharp decline in military virtue and virility. The inhabitants of Gaul 
were neither passive nor static between 121 and 63 B.C. They instead developed intimate 
financial and commercial ties to the Roman world.46 7 The groups within the frontier zone 
also faced a social and political transformation that may only have been partially 
complete by the time of the Gallic Wars. There are strong hints that property owners 
were displacing warrior elites throughout much of Gallia and the frontier. The Cimbri 
may have been so disruptive driving population off key pieces of land that prices 
dropped, allowing more fortunate landowners to acquire and consolidate larger plots.48
46 The idea in Cicero’s speech centers around the testimony of a Vestal Virgin, brought in defense of the 
ex-governor. For the peace o f the gods and fear o f the Gauls, see Rawson, “Religio i and Politics,” in 
Roman Culture and Society: Collected Papers, 149-168; William V. Harris, War and Imperialism in 
Republican Rome 327-70 BC (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 118-122; Williams, Beyond the Rubicon, 
152-166.
47 Strabo Geogr., 4.4.1; J.P.V.D. Balsdon, Romans and Aliens (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina 
University Press, 1979), 66; Barry Cunliffe, The Oxford Illustrated Prehistory of Europe (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 350-353. Strabo states that Gaul produces a considerable number of swine, and is 
a major supplier o f Italy. The inhabitants were also notable for their hunting dogs. The import of choice 
was Roman wine.
48 Stephen L. Dyson, The Creation of the Roman Frontier (Princeton: Princeton Unviersity Press, 1987), 
164-170. Cf. Strabo Geogr., 7.2.1. A story ran that the Helvetii, who had previously been a settled, 
peaceful people, became inspired to warfare after encountering the Cimbri, who had grown conspicuously 
richer due to war-spoils. It may be that the warrior aristocracy, which would have depended upon prestige 
goods, was undercut by a land-owner’s ability to engage in commerce.
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Increased commerce with the Mediterranean, either over the Alps or via Massilia, further 
fueled this consolidation, weakening the system of chiefdoms and the warrior aristocracy 
that had previously controlled much of Gaul through an economy of prestige goods/9 
The flourishing of profitable contact between the Republic and Celtica would have added 
incentive for Rome to ensure Gallia’s stability. The suggestion of such disruption is 
attractive because it explains an upsurge in inter-Gallic conflict, but also indicates the 
motive for one group to invite the Germani into the region, as the Sequani may have 
needed Ariovistus’ assistance against their more prosperous enemies, the Aedui..
The frontier system established in 121 B.C. gave Rome key allies (socios) in the 
Aedui, who were already opponents to the weakened Arverni. The Aedui were by 
Caesar’s time frequently feuding with their eastern neighbors, particularly the Sequani, 
whose own territory abutted the Rhine. The aforementioned Allobroges, another eastern 
neighbor, were also enemies to the Aedui, and Rome intervened on their side both in 122 
B.C. and again during a second revolt in 62.30 The Senate decreed that responsibility for 
the safety of the frontier and the Aedui rested with the proconsul of Transalpine Gaul 
during the conflict, and Caesar cites this obligation during his exchanges with 
Ariovistus.5, Unlike the other major actors in the Gallic Wars, Ariovistus did not have 49*51
49 For an introduction to pre-conquest Gaul, see Anthony King, Roman Gaul and Germany (Berkeley: 
University o f California, 1990), 11-33; Greg Woolf, “Regional Productions in Early Roman Gaul,” in 
Economies Beyond Agriculture in the Classical World, Leicester-Nottingham Studies in Ancient History 
volume nine, ed. David J. Mattingly and John Salmon (London: Routledge 2001), 52. For the Roman idea 
of tribe, see Claude Nicolet, Space, Geography, and Politics in the Early Roman Empire (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan, 1994), 189-190. For a description of Entremont, a city of the Sailuvii quite close 
to the Roman ideal, see Ebel, Transalpine Gaul, 65-66. Caesar typically describes the Galli in the BG by 
calling them civitates, with its implications of a legally organized community. This was by no means 
typical (Cicero, for example, uses gentes), but underscores the fact that Caesar was operating within a 
network o f existing political entities with their own interests and not a random horde.
30 Ebel, Transalpine Gaul, 70. The Allobroges were in Rome in 63 B.C. partly because of this campaign, 
as their debt to Roman lenders originated in the indemnity caused by their defeat.
51 Caes. B Gall., 1.35.
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any connection to previous wars in Gaul, he was a newcomer. The Sequani contacted 
him sometime in the late 60’s to assist them in overcoming the Aedui. Ariovistus had 
marriage ties to the Suebi, a large confederation east of the Rhine, and to the kingdom of 
Noricum, an ally of Rome, making him a prominent leader and possibly a creditable 
patron even in Roman eyes. Because of pressure created by Germanic movements, or 
similar Gallic offers, the Helevtii began preparations lor a mass migration with some of 
their allies in 62, while the Catilinarian Conspiracy and concern over Gaul was still 
present in Roman minds. These events emphasize the critical point that the frontier zone, 
thought secure in 69, was no longer so seven years later, let alone eleven.
The changes in both Rome and Gaul reached a head before Caesar was even in 
position to intervene. Ariovistus made good on his promises to the Sequani, inflicting a 
near-crippling defeat on the Aedui not long before March of 60, as one of Cicero’s letters 
tells:
[T]he great thing just now is the Gallic war-scare. Our Aeduan brothers have 
recently taken a beating, and there is no doubt that the Helvetii are up in arms and 
raiding the Province. The Senate has decreed that. . .  ambassadors with full 
powers be sent to visit the Gallic communities and try to stop them making 
common cause with the Helvetii.52 53
The Helvetii were nowhere near Roman territory, and Cicero may have confused 
them with Ariovistus. Regardless, Rome’s first response was diplomatic, and it 
worked. The instigator of the Helvetian migration, Orgetorix, perished in a power 
struggle, and the Helvetii disappeared from Rome’s immediate view. Orgetorix had 
attempted to use his people’s migration to forge a power bloc and to that end had
52 Cic. An., 1.19, transl. E. O. Bailey, New York, 1920. Notably, this affair actually drew attention away 
from land issues.
53 App. Gall., 16; Caes. B Gall., 1.35. Appian claims that Caesar “himself vot[ed] for” the amicitia with 
Ariovistus. Caesar, perhaps predictably, does not say whether he did or not.
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established marriage ties to Dumnorix of the Aedui, and Casticus of the Sequani. 4 He 
planned to lead the Helvetii and their allies through Sequani territory and join forces with 
the Aedui, the strongest Gallic community. Cicero seems aware of some coming 
resolution to the affair by June of 60 B.C.54 5 One key interpretation of these events is that 
the senatorial decree to the proconsul was aimed against Ariovistus but Rome then allied 
with him against the Helvetii.56 Certainly the Aeduan defeat, Casticus’ subsequent 
downfall (Caesar never again mentions him), and Cicero’s assumption that the Helvetii 
were responsible support the idea. As for Ariovistus, the Senate accepted him into an 
amicitia (a less defined relationship than socios) by 59, during Caesar’s consulship, 
bringing him into the existing diplomatic network.57 Insofar as the Romans could see, the 
death of Orgetorix had prevented the Helvetii from disrupting the frontier and Ariovistus 
had accepted an accord. By May, Gaul was so peaceful that Cicero could mock a 
colleague for missing a chance at a triumph.58 The frontier remained *ntact, and the 
Rhine was still not involved.
While the frontier system remained intact in 61 B.C., Rome’s northern security 
was in a state of flux. The individuals of note during the period of the Gallic Wars and 
later were in many cases reaching their pre-eminence. Caesar was campaigning as 
proprietor in Hispania, while his future partner and rival Pompey was returning from his 
successful eastern campaigns. It is not clear precisely when Ariovistus arrived in Gaul,
54 Caes. B Gall., 1.2-1.4. This background was important for Caesar because it elevated the threat of the 
entire frontier erupting into conflict, but also to foreshadow the involvement of Dumnorix and the trouble 
he would later cause.
55 Cic .An., 2.1.
56 Holmes, Caesar’s Conquest of Gaul, 38-49.
37 For these issues, see A. N. Sherwin-White, The Roman Citizenship, second edition (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1973); Erich S. Gruen, The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome, volume one 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
58 Cic. Att., 1.20.
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or how much of an effect he had until the defeat of the Aedui.51 Some Galli had grown 
rich and powerful through contacts with Rome, while others pursued more traditional 
routes to leading status. For example, Dumnorix, whose personal retinue of cavalry 
seems to have survived the Aeduan defeat, competed with his brother, the pro-Roman 
druid Diviciacus, for influence within the Aedui. Diviciacus had apparently approached 
the Senate for assistance after the Aeduan defeat.01' Dumnorix likely had the advantage 
through his control over lolls and tax contracts because these sources of revenue provided 
the cash to maintain armed retainers and to make loans.* 601 Orgetorix’ death cost him one 
connection to the Helvetii, but Ariovistus’ occupation of the Sequani compensated by 
making Dumnorix their lone ally in central Gaul. Unfortunately, with Ariovistus 
preventing travel through Sequani territory, the only way for the Helvetii to enter central 
Gaul was by transgressing the boundaries of Transalpine Gaul in 58.62 Also in that year, 
Rome’s proconsul of Transalpine Gaul learned of their approach, marched to meet them, 
fortified the Saone, refused the Helvetii access, repelled their answering assault, and 
marched after them. So began the Gallic Wars.
The Roman Frontier -  War as Politics
The lead-in to the Gallic Wars makes three things clear. First, the theoretical 
model of a frontier zone describes the strategic situation superbly.63 As Cicero’s letters
M! Holmes, Caesar’s Conquest o f Gaul, 553-554. The consensus view at Holmes’ writing was apparently 
that the Germani entered Gaul around 71 B.C., although some argue as late as 61. The dating is a question 
o f how literally to take certain lines in the BG. Ariovistus’ arrival is less important for this study than how 
the Romans and Galli dealt with it.
60 Caes. B Gall., 1.39; Caes. B Gall., 6.12; Cic. Div., 1.41.90.
61 Caes. B Gall., 1.18. Diviciacus was supported by Rome. Caesar is not shy of accusing Dumnorix of 
working against him, especially just before the second voyage to Britain in 54. Dumnorix was killed 
attempting to escape the expedition.
62 Caes. B Gall., 1.10-1.11.
63 Dyson, The Creation of the Roman Frontier, 136-173.
33
demonstrate, the Senate was aware of occurrences within Gaul quite distant from Rome’s 
own provinces, and there was concern for the fallen fortunes of her regional ally, the 
Aedui. Second, the strategic situation was of an essentially political character. Rome’s 
territorial boundaries were not breached (although Caesar noted the future likelihood of 
this) nor were her citizens attacked, but the city’s dominion was upset. Rome dealt with 
autonomous dependencies, but ruled through financial, political, and military obligations, 
ties that two large migrating populations with martial reputations would alter. Either 
population, Helvetii or Germani, would have transformed the comparative prestige, 
wealth, and strength of the native communities, changing their relative positions, and 
undermining Rome’s influence within the frontier zone.64 65 Thus, Caesar’s pursuit of war 
after taking office was to address this situation and to prevent destabilization.
Before turning specifically to the respective roles of Ariovistus and the Rhine in 
the BG, Caesar’s own role deserves discussion. The Gallic Wars occurred at a time when 
Rome awarded greater levels of power to individual delegates, with Caesar and Pompey 
being the most important examples. The conflict was concurrent with their political 
union and may have contributed to Rome’s breakdown into another civil war. This said, 
the rise of Caesar’s fortunes within Roman politics due to his success in Gaul does not 
directly concern this paper.63 A greater concern is Caesar’s typicality, or the extent to
64 The precise quality at issue is that o f dignitas. For an individual, dignitas generally indicates “honor” or 
“reputation,” while collectively it has an association with influence. The Roman concern for it stems from 
a belief that the quality summons respect and discourages attack. For a discussion of dignitas in general 
and related values, see J. E. Lendon, Empire of Honor (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), esp. Appendix I, 
272-279; Susan P. Mattern, Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1999), 15-23; Cic. Pis., 11.9, 24.57.
65 This is an element that Caesar himself does not emphasize (aside from when his grain supplies are in 
danger) but modern commentators never fail to notice. For example, Strabo relates that the treasure of 
Toulouse, a total of 15,000 talents, was largely collected from lakes and that some suspected that this 
wealth came from the Celtic sack of Delphi in the third century. Strabo, 4.1.13. Cf. Cic. Att., 5.17; Cic.
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which his actions fit into the accepted sociopolitical role of a Republican proconsul. This 
is an important issue precisely because the Gallic Wars did not initially involve either 
Caesar or the Rhine. The governor of Transalpine Gaul was responsible for the security 
of the frontier zone, and Caesar’s actions in Book One, indeed even the composition of 
the BG itself, were consistent with that responsibility. Using Macedonia as his example, 
Cicero asks:
Who ever held control of a province and its forces, and sent no single dispatch to 
the Senate? Above all, when that province was so important and equipped with 
forces so numerous [and] has such formidable barbarian tribes [gentes] upon its 
borders [attinguit, to reach] that our Macedonian commanders have always acted 
as if the limits \fmes] of their province were only those of their swords and 
javelins.66
The role of provincial governor included two specific obligations that the Romans 
expected the officeholder to fill. One was to keep the Senate informed of his activities, 
and since the claims in these commentaries would suggest future honors, some 
grandstanding was expected. Secondly, and critically, the governor was a military 
commander responsible for protecting territorial integrity by campaigning against 
dangerous groups at the edges of the province. Caesar’s own decision was to eject the 
Germani from Gaul by using the Rhine as a landmark. Clearly, his actions are not totally 
inconsistent with Roman expectations.
In broad terms, Caesar was a typical proconsul, since Roman governors were 
predominantly military commanders and not administrators during the Republic. Aside
Fam., 7.7. Cicero advises his client Trebatus to do his best at making his fortune under Caesar’s command. 
These letters are also significant because they demonstrates that, regardless of why Rome went to a 
territory, the Romans did expect to get something for the effort: “I hear that Britain has not an ounce of 
either gold or silver.” For the expropriation of wealth in general, see P. A. Brunt, “Laus Imperii,” in 
Imperialism in the Ancient World, ed. P. D. A. Garnsey and C. R. Whittaker, Ih e  Cambridge University 
Research Seminar in Ancient History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 159-191.
66 Cic. Pis., 16.38, transl. N. H. Watts, London, 1931. The exact same circumstances existed in Gaul.
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from Caesar, only Cicero leaves an intact, personal account of his governorship during 
the Late Republic. Cicero was proconsul of Cilicia in 50 B.C. and led at least one 
campaign and siege. A fellow senator congratulated him on his administration of the 
province, but refused to recommend a triumph/’7 Good rule was clearly not viewed with 
the same credit as military glory. Provincial governors possessed a level of imperium 
(“absolute authority”) equal to the highest magistrates of Rome, with the power to protect 
Rome’s citizens, settle disputes between native communities (including the definition of 
their territory), and to campaign independently according to necessity.61 *8 Proconsuls 
settled disputes and made treaties on their own authority, but their administration was 
generally limited to appropriating resources, overseeing taxation, and collecting 
indemnities.
The practical independence of governors occasionally caused Rome great 
difficulty by causing inconvenient warfare or, worse, defeat, and it is important to view 
the BG with this in mind.69 The key feature for the Romans themselves was success, not 
motive, and it is tempting to see some connection with the pax deorum in this.70 
Although the Rhine had greater significance in later books of the BG as a line between
61 Cic. Fain., 15.5. Cicero, who had little inclination towards military affairs, almost makes it seem that he
campaigned only because it was expected of him. His correspondence is also interesting because it
suggests a haphazardness in Rome’s deployments: “You can take it from me here and now: at this time,
with this army, and in this place, just so much could be done.” Cic. Att., 5.20, transl. Dr. R. Shackleton
Bailey, New York, 1986. Cf. Brunt, “Laus Imperii,” in Imperialism in the Ancient World, 178, footnote
69, regarding Roman dispositions prior to the Gallic Wars.
68 Provinces had only gradually become associated with territory, and essentially consisted of a task or
category for which the governor would be granted consular imperium. J. S. Richardson, Hispaniae: Spain 
and the Development of Roman Imperialism, 218-82 BC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 
4-5.
69 Since such poor judgment reflected badly upon senatorial class, these examples had great rhetorical 
effect. Cicero, for example, pointedly passes over a string of such examples prior to praising Caesar, 
whose success apparently justified his actions. Cic. Pis., 21.50.
70 Nathan Rosenstein, Imperatores Victi: Military Defeat and Aristocratic Competition in the Middle and 
Late Republic l Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 54-91. The sociological element of pax 
deorum involved removing blame from individual Roman aristocrats for unsuccessful campaigns.
36
Germani and Galli. in Book One it was a simple political division between the Germani 
of Ariovistus and the Sequani, to whom Caesar offered protection (see below). Caesar’s 
proconsular imperium allowed him to simply declare the river the border, which would 
make sense to Roman minds because bodies of water were customarily used for defining 
large regions. '1 As his opening lines demonstrate, Caesar used rivers other than the 
Rhine to differentiate one group’s land from another, but these were as much political 
divisions as ethnic. In point of fact Caesar concentrates quite specifically on the Rhine, 
especially once he begins his argument against Rome’s alliance with Ariovistus. The 
nature of the division, at least in Book One, remains a political one.
Two Opponents -  Helvetii and Germani
The narrative of the BG opens with the Helvetii, explaining Caesar’s activities in 
terms of the threat they pose to the province and the Aedui. Specific mention of 
Ariovistus does not occur until after the Helvetian defeat, in a meeting with the Gallic 
leaders. The rhetorical goal of the BG becomes immediately apparent. Even as the 
supposed danger is introduced, it is described in relation to another: “the Helvetii were . . 
. leading to the rest of the Galli in courage, because they often fought daily battles with 
the Germani, so that they both keep [the Germani] from their own territory and wage war 
in [Germanic] territory themselves.”71 2 As noted in the introduction, the Germani are 
introduced as a group before the territory of Germania itself. In point of fact, Caesar 
introduces the Germani as a frontier threat prior discussing them as a people who were
71 In 46 B.C., Cicero describes the provinces won by Caesar by their boundaries, the Rhine, Ocean, and 
Nile, all bodies o f water. Cic. Scaur., 9.28. The Po River, for example, helped define Cisalpine Gaul. See 
Nicholas Purcell, “The Creation of Provincial Landscape: The Roman Impact on Cisalpine Gaul,” in The 
Early Roman Empire in the West, ed. Thomas Blagg and Martin Millet (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 1990).
72Caes. BGall., 1.1.
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trims Rhenum incolunt (“living across the Rhine”). The first chapter of Book One 
introduces two tropes for Caesar regarding the Germani and the Rhine. First, he 
emphasizes the alienness of the Germani with structures that underscore their belonging 
elsewhere, in the process preparing his audience for his decision regarding the border of 
the Galli, at the Rhine. Second, there were conflicting images of the Galli themselves, a 
factor in Roman rhetoric as demonstrated by Cicero. The BG emphasizes the 
development and sophistication of the Galli and not an elemental, barbarian image. The 
Helvetii retain some of the latter, heightening the tension in the narrative, but through 
their positive comparison with the Germani, Caesar’s principal target becomes clearer.
Caesar at length defeated the Helvetii outside the Aeduan capital of Bibracte, 
resettling them in their old land with winter supplies from the Allobroges.73 “[Caesar] 
did this for this chief reason, because he did not want the location which the Helvetii had 
left to be empty, so that the Germani, who live across the Rhine [trans Rhenum incolunt], 
would not cross from their territory into Helvetian territory for the good fields [honitum 
agrorum] and be at the border \finitimi] of the Gallic province and the Allobroges.”74 
This passage sees one threat handily eliminated while introducing a greater one. The 
passage revisits the theme that the Rhine separated the Galli from the Germani. It also 
indicates the prosperity and development of the Galli by mentioning the “good fields,” 
suggesting that such resources (which the province possessed) invited attack. Third, the 
passage makes plain the proximity of the threat. If the Germani crossed the Rhine, they
7’ The Helvetii had burned their property prior to migration. Caesar suggests that it was to prevent second 
thoughts. It may in reality have been a sacrificial or cultic procedure or attempt to leave possible enemies 
few chances for loot. Whatever the actual motive, the act fit into Roman ideals o f bravery, underscoring 
the courage of the Helvetti and thus that of their enemies (both Germani and Caesar). Caes. B Gall., ! .5.
74 Caes. B Gall., 1.28, transl. Carolyn Hammond, Oxford, 1996.
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would be abutting the territory of Rome and her dominion. The Helvetii had suffered a 
major defeat and were therefore weaker than before, but Caesar’s victory had also left 
them dependent and allowed him to act as patron (via the Allobroges). They had a right 
to return to their own land, which had become included within the frontier zone.
With the Helvetian problem solved, the narrative turns to a convention of the 
Gallic communities’ leading men.75 Caesar’s comparison between the Galli and the 
German! begins in earnest with this council. The Galli requested the proconsul’s 
presence to air their concerns, indicating their understanding of Rome’s place within the 
frontier zone. At the meeting, Caesar acts as mediator among the various groups, from 
investigating allegations against Dumnorix to outlining, in full, the Germanic issue. The 
narrative does not describe the precise relationship of Ariovistus to Rome. The BG 
instead explains his reprehensible behavior towards the Aedui and, by extension, Rome. 
From this convention onward, the BG is replete with indications that Ariovistus could not 
be trusted to respect Rome’s dignitas or her allies. As proconsul of Transalpine Gaul, 
Caesar took it upon himself to settle the border dispute between the Galli and Germani 
according to Rome’s best interests.
The Galli -  Cowed Subjects under a Haughty Warlord
The Gallic convention is one of the BG 's truly dramatic portions. Language 
indicative of invasion, of crossing a static object or landmark, is also more common at 
this point in the narrative, building upon the earlier comparisons between Helvetii and 
Germani. Diviciacus acts as speaker for the Galli as they “all wept and threw themselves
75 Caes. B Gall., ] .30. The Gallic envoys asking for the meeting also acknowledge Caesar’s assistance to 
them in defeating the incoming Helvetii. This may have been flattery, but more than likely was Caesar’s 
own reinforcement o f the initial danger that brought him there. These communities were probably those of 
Celtica only. Holmes, Caesar’s Conquest o f Gaul, 634.
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at Caesar’s feet.” He explains how “these wild and savage men [feri ac barbari] had 
conceived a passionate desire for the lands of the Galli, their way of life, and their 
wealth,” but notes that “a worse fate had befallen the victorious Sequani than the defeated 
Aedui.”76 If any of Caesar’s audience suffered from terror gallicus, this passage seems 
destined to shatter it, as it sharply contrasts a weakened but prosperous people and a 
strong, dangerous one. The former sackers of Rome cannot only be conquered, of which 
Cicero was confident in 69 B.C., but they were already so, as Ariovistus was showing. 
The text describes their behavior {fluentes Caesari ad pedes proiecerunt) in the same 
terms used for the defeated, and newly submissive, Helvetii (adpedes proiecissent. . . 
fluentes) -  both groups “falling to his feet, prostrated themselves.”77 78The Galli appear as 
supplicants begging for the protection (and forgiveness?) of Rome. This portrayal 
synergizes with the fact that Ariovistus, who once possessed relatively few warriors, was 
continuing his people’s migration with a new wave of settlers. The Galli, once 
numerous, have been cut down in battle (despite their ties to Rome) and suffered the 
depredations of their assumed ally (also Rome’s). The Germani, meanwhile, continued 
to grow in strength. Gallic fides, if not outright dependence, is juxtaposed to Ariovistus’ 
possible lack thereof.
Only their spokesman, the druid Diviciacus, seems unconquered, as he retained 
his honor by not yielding to Ariovistus’ demands for hostages and an oath of obedience 
to the Sequani. If the Germani, personalized in their leader Ariovistus, are dangerous,
76 Caes. B Gall., 1.31, transl. Carolyn Hammond, Oxford, 1996. Their way o f life is another theme to 
which Caesar will return, although he notes here “nor was there any contest between the two.”
77 Caes.B G all., 1.27.
78 These were traditional practices indicating submission and helped to maintain control over the defeated 
power. Oaths and hostages were customary practices, and also the assurances of loyalty that Caesar tended
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the spokesperson for the Galli, Diviciacus, is depicted favorably. Diviciacus’ character 
provides Caesar with a foil for Ariovistus. He remained true to his own status and his 
people’s association to Rome by demonstrating the aristocratic virtue of honor. He had 
petitioned the Senate for assistance, albeit unsuccessfully. As such, the text shows 
Diviciacus to be as trustworthy as a Roman might be, and gives Rome’s proconsul ample 
cause to settle the matter.
Caesar underscores the Germanic threat in his description of the damage to 
Rome’s allies, which he gives in terms meant to suggest Rome’s own sociopolitical 
hierarchy. Ariovistus, identified as the rex of the Germani, had toppled the Aedui by 
killing or taking hostage their omnem nobilitatem, ornnem senatum, and omnem 
equitation. These groups -- the nobles (descendents of consulars), the senators (land- 
owners and junior magistrates), and the cavalrymen (the equestrian order) -  formed the 
basis of the Roman res publica.79 The repetition of omnem (“the entire”) reinforces the 
comparison between the near destruction of the Aedui and what Ariovistus might do 
against Rome in the future by making Ariovistus the enemy of every class, not just a 
single party, in other words, Caesar’s argument against Ariovistus was not just that the 
Germani were militaristic or ignored Rome’s interests, but that they endangered the 
social fabric of Roman society and that of the frontier zone.
to demand (a third, indemnities, has a much lower profile in the BG). The intent here may be to portray 
Ariovistus as usurping Rome’s position, not just in imitating her practices, but by making such demands 
upon her allies. This would make sense, because hostages and oaths featured prominently in the practice of 
deditio, which could have a ritualistic overtone and connection with the idea of the pax deorum. The point 
was not only to win, but to be acknowledged as the victor, with all rights to property and acknowledgement 
of the justness of the war. Mattern, Rome and the Enemy, 217-219; Richardson, Hispaniae, 142-143.
79 In his defense of Milo, Cicero mocks his opponent by anthropomorphizing society: “The Senate mourns; 
the equestrian order is inconsolable; the whole community is bowed down with affliction; the 
muo'cipalities wear the garb o f woe; the colonies are heartbroken; why, the very fields are pining. . . . ” 
Aside from the elite, only the political unit counts. Cic. Mil., 8.20.
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After Diviciacus’ speech, the BG again displays the Galli as supplicants, and this 
is especially true of the Sequani, who were worse off for joining with Ariovistus than for 
opposing him. With the Germani “inside their territory” (intra finis suos), they cannot 
escape from Ariovistus’ influence. Caesar acted in proconsular fashion and agrees to
O  1
settle the dispute, offering the Sequani his patronage in the process. He professed the 
desire to employ his status to marshal a receptive hearing from Ariovistus while 
reiterating the principal reasons for concern: close relations with the Aedui (fratres 
consanguineosque -  “brothers and family members”) who have suffered injury, the 
growing number of Germani who continue to enter Gallia, and Ariovistus’ reported 
arrogance. He also compared the contemporary situation and with the invasion of the 
Cimbri and Teutoni, including a reminder of proximity to Roman territory.80 12 This 
comparison reinforces the earlier imagery of the supplicant Galli, especially the pathetic 
Sequani, and further vilifies Ariovistus as being beyond his bounds.
In an earlier passage regarding the Helvetian migration, Caesar had characterized 
the Rhone and the Rhine in quite different ways. While the Rhine was latissimo atque 
altissimo (“very wide and quite deep”), the Rhone had non nullis locis vado transitur (“a 
shallow place to cross in no few locations”).83 The use of superlatives to describe the 
Rhine’s impassability contrasts with a double negative (non nullis, lit. “not none”) when 
describing the traversable Rhone. The Rhone was also a major trade route, whereas
80 Caes. B Gall., i .32.
81 This constituted a perceived law, with the weak obeying the strong and the strong shielding the weak. 
Patron client relations may have been eclipsed in Rome, but foreigners and provincials might still require 
an agent within the Roman system. P. A. Brunt, The Fail of the Roman Republic (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1988), 390-421; E. Badian, Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic, second edition (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1968), 15.
82 Caes. B Gall., 1.33. Marius defeated the Cimbri near the Po River, and Caesar notes that only the Rhone 
stands between the land of the Sequani and “our province” (i.e. Transalpine Gaul).
83 Caes .B G a li,  1.2, 1.6.
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Roman merchants had not had much dealing across the Rhine. Clearly, Caesar thought 
(or meant others to think) that the Rhine was far more formidable than the more familiar 
river. The Rhone was not especially defensible, at least for long, so the practical solution 
was to pursue and engage the enemy. The Rhine was difficult to cross in the first place, 
so it was crucial to prevent an established beachhead. Caesar therefore set out the danger 
of an unrestrained Ariovistus before even encountering him. He credited Diviciacus with 
making the suggestion that “in a few years they [the Galli] would all be driven out of 
Gaul, and in turn all the German[i] would cross the Rhine.”84 85This theme of movement 
across a fixed point is recurring -  Rhenum transisse\ Rhenum transirenf, Rhenum 
traducatur -  and such language culminates after the speech: Rhenum transire el in 
Gallium . . .  venire (“[they] crossed the Rhine and came into Gaul”).8'’ The Germani had 
not just attacked a people friendly to Rome, they were continuing to do so, and, above ail, 
they had passed a known marker and come into Gaul. In other words, the danger to the 
frontier aside, the Germani simply did not belong in Gallia. Caesar successfully casts 
Ariovistus and the Germani as a group less trustworthy than the Galli, more terrible than 
the Galli, and, completely unlike the Galli, in a place they should not be.
After the convention, Caesar began marching into Sequani territory, heading for
their citadel of Vesontio. Along the way, he exchanged several missives with his
opponent. From the convention to the onset of battle, the BG describes a chieftain in
every way worthy of the charges leveled previously, while Caesar continues to portray
himself as Rome’s champion and Gallia’s patron. Ariovistus did not respect Caesar’s
beneficio ..  . auctoritate as Caesar had predicted to the Gauls. He proved arrogant,
84Caes. B G ali, 1.31.
85 Caes. B Gall., 1.33.
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cowardly, and dishonorable -  Ariovistus would not come to Caesar when requested, he 
would not come without an army, and he did not justify himself beyond the right of 
conquest (ius belli).86 In other words, he would not act as a faithful (in fidem) ally 
should. This series of exchanges follow s a pattern according to which Caesar and 
Ariovistus explain their positions, only for the latter to prove intractable to the requests of 
the proconsul to the point of attacking during the process. Caesar’s principle demands 
are the restoration of hostages and property to the Aedui and for Ariovistus to stop the 
flow of Germani into Gaul.87 Ariovistus’ reply in the first exchange, which takes place 
through envoys, consisted of a show' of strength. Ariovistus questioned the right of 
Rome’s proconsul to make such demands, as, operating under ius belli, the Aeduan 
relationship with Rome could not protect ihem if they should provoke him.88 The 
Germanic leader thus placed the exercise of might above and beyond the obligations 
inherent within his relationship to Rome, obligations even the Helvetii had respected.89 
Ariovistus indeed “had assumed such haughtiness as was not to be borne.”90
Ariovistus -- A Villainous Leader
Caesar’s rhetoric does not rely entirely upon character assassination. During the 
march, messengers from the Aedui and Treveri reported the massing of Suebi along the
86 Caes. B Gall., 1.34. Caesar, of course, ultimately drew his authority from the Senate and people of 
Rome.
87 Caes. B Gall., 1.35; 1.43.
88 Caes. B Gall., 1.36.
89 Caes. B Gall., 1.7 (they awaited Caesar’s answer to their request for passage); 1.13 (they asked him to 
provide a place to settle).
1 Caes. B Gall., 1.33. The Romans required suitable respect for their honor, not just personal dignitas. 
Mattern, Rome and the Enemy, 171-194.
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Rhine, with one of the Germanic leaders tellingly named Cimberius.91 The appearance of 
these new Germani “proved” that Ariovistus did plan to invade, and at least suggested an 
intended ambush for Caesar as well. The Roman forces nonetheless claimed the Sequani 
oppidum of Vesontio before ihe Germani. Once there, the Roman officers almost staged 
a mutiny, although Caesar managed to regain control quickly. The aborted mutiny was 
not as important in itself as Caesar’s means of regaining control, his insistence that the 
most effective defense against the Germani was Rome’s martial strength.92 The ability of 
Rome to protect herself and her allies by meeting enemies openly in the field underscored 
her place in the world (the pax deorum, at which Caesar hints) and demonstrated the 
superiority of the Roman way of life. There was no greater expression of a people’s 
moral virtue than the ability to face and defeat a foe in pitched battle, a standard which 
the Germani had not met even in the defeat of the Galli (this will be discussed in Chapter 
Three). Ariovistus apparently felt the same, “since he was now offering unasked what he 
had previously refused to do when expressly requested,” and sought a personal parley 
with Caesar.93
The face-to-face meeting marks the second time Ariovistus justified the Gallic 
account of arrogance and undue destruction. With rhetorical flourish, Rome’s proconsul 
again acts with consideration, while the supposed friend proves recalcitrant. Caesar again 
expresses Rome’s superior position in the relationship, if in more diplomatic terms than 
before, emphasizing the result of Roman custom and reiterating his demands. Rome’s
91 Caes. B Gall., 1.37. It is difficult to know, but it seems likely that this part at least was Caesar’s own 
narrative invention. He could not know that he would be having much more intimate contact with the 
Treveri and Suebi three years later.
92 Caes. BGall., 1.38-1,40.
93 Caes. B Gall., 1.42.
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favor leads to increased, not reduced, prosperity for those to whom it is awarded, 
explicitly declaring that involvement within the Roman frontier was to the benefit of the 
population.,4 Ariovistus brushes these concerns aside more dramatically than before, and 
proceeds to act every inch the unworthy recipient and haughty king as he had earlier by 
proxy.94 5 96This exchange ended after the Germani began to attack Caesar’s bodyguard, 
prompting Caesar to withdraw. A second request to parley comes not long after, but 
Caesar sends envoys instead of going personally. Although the narrative does not 
identify this incident as an ambush, Caesar avoided dispatching any of his officers due to 
safety concerns. The provincials that he did dispatch were promptly imprisoned.9'’ This 
final charge of Ariovistus’ lack oifides, that he would violate the sanctity of envoys, 
proved a moot point, as the armies set out on their respective maneuvering.
Caesar’s argument against the Germani entered its final stages during the face-to- 
face meeting. The alien rex defended himself only to again turn to threatening Caesar: 
he had crossed the Rhine (transisse Rhenum) when asked by the Galli; he was in Gaul for 
wealth (spe magnisque praemiis) which he had won by iure belli and imposed as victor 
(victores victis imponere); the Galli (omnis gallis civitates -  “all the Gallic 
communities”) had attacked him and he had won; they could try again, but could not
94 Caes. B Gall., 1.43.
^  Caes. B Gall., 1.44. Interestingly, Caesar gives Ariovistus a speech detailing inconsistencies in Rome’s 
imperialistic behavior, in more general terms than the occasional passage criticizing the Senate’s sloth. 
Although the criticisms are given in detail, Caesar brushes them off in reply. One scholar suggests that this 
was a fairly common feature o f Roman literature, implying that the Romans were not concerned for the 
morality o f  their activities, at least in any universal sense. Isaac, The Invention of Racism in Classical 
Antiquity, 215-224. Dealing with another incident in Tacitus’ Agricola, Isaac concludes (221): “the reader 
is left with the conviction that the accusations o f the enemy commander are true, but, in Roman eyes 
irrelevant.”
9d Ariovistus claims to have a close connection, through messengers, with leading men in Rome, and thus 
knows that killing Caesar would earn him favor. Furthermore, he attempts to dismiss Caesar by offering 
himself as a proxy over Gaul. These claims, and the offer, are fraught with problems of interpretation 
beyond the scope of this paper.
96 Caes .B G all., 1.47.
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claim peace without tribute (stipendium); he had accepted the amiciti[a] populi romani as 
an ornamento el praesidio, non detrimento (“a distinction and a advantage, not an 
injury”) so if he had to give up the tribute this particular “honor” would be worthless. 
Ariovistus also addressed Caesar’s concerns, claiming the influx of settlers was for his 
own protection and that he had a priori rights to Gaul anyway because of the invitation 
and his martial success. Just as Caesar had extolled Rome’s role in increasing the 
fortunes of her allies, Ariovistus proclaims its worthlessness, citing the failure of Rome to 
aid the Aedui against the Sequani. He also questioned the support of the Senate for 
Caesar.9, With the possible exception of his future imprisonment of the envoys, the 
passage describing the face-to-face meeting presents Ari ovistus’ villainy, given a 
foundation by Diviciacus at the Gallic convention, in its full splendor. Neither the honor 
of Rome nor the authority of the proconsul would protect the frontier from the Germanic 
chieftain.
The face-to-face meeting is the real culmination of Caesar’s argument. At this 
point in the narrative, Caesar remains conciliatory and does not demand that the Germani 
leave Gaul, merely that they stop coming over the Rhine into Gaul and that they restore 
the property of Rome’s allies, the Aedui. Caesar appeals to his authority as proconsul, 
which Ariovistus, an amicus, should respect. The chieftain must respect the decisions of 
the Senate and Rome’s policy of strengthening her friends and allies, not looting them. 
Ariovistus, however, recognizes only the only law of war (superior strength), and that it 
is the place of the victor to dictate terms. Having defeated all the Gallic communities, he 97
97 Ariovistus claims to have a close connection, through messengers, with leading men in Rome, and thus 
knows that killing Caesar would earn him favor. Furthermore, he attempts to dismiss Caesar by offering 
himself as a proxy over Gaul. These claims, and the offer, are difficult enough to prove, let alone Caesar’s 
reasons to include them.
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gained full power over it regardless of any boundaries. Caesar’s explicit identification of 
Ariovistus as rex may be a reference to Rome's own history of kings, especially given the 
chieftain’s attack on the republican classes of the Aedui. Perhaps worst of all, Ariovistus 
sought to subvert the honor that the Senate bestowed upon him for his own glorification. 
He was not the type of leader that Rome could accommodate, nor, by extension, were the 
feri ac barbari trans Rhenum incolunt (“fierce and wild peoplem living across the 
Rhine”) that he ruled. As proconsul, a position with obligations both to protect regional 
allies and to settle border disputes, Caesar could not accept such an uncontrollable force 
within the frontier zone. Indeed, warfare commenced almost immediately after the 
meeting. Regardless of the actual facts, Caesar’s argument that Ariovistus’ character, 
and by extension his people’s nature, were undesirable and untrustworthy in Gaul 
justified the only possible solution -  total victory. This meant a Gaul free of Germani, 
with the Rhine separating Gallia from these others.
Book One of the BG ends with the defeat of Ariovistus. The Germani, both those 
facing Caesar and those (if any) further north, were driven away from the Rhine's banks. 
Although Ariovistus survived the rout, the victory was decisive. Just as the Germani had 
come trans Rhenum, news of their defeat also traveled trans Rhenum9* No more 
Germani threatened to follow their predecessors for the time being, and Caesar departed 
for Cisalpine Gaul. The Rhine River remained a marker for the finis of individual 
groups, but its underpinnings as something more had appeared. With clearly dangerous 
people living on the western side, the logical conclusion was that the Roman frontier 
must include it, or else those groups which Rome relied on to buffer its actual territory 98
98Caes. BGall., 1.54.
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(and with whom she traded) would fall, as the Aedui and Sequani almost had. The 
Helvetii may have been the most dangerous of the Galli, but they were still Galli. Once 
defeated, they could remain within the frontier and possibly strengthen it. The Germani, 
however, had demonstrated under, or because of, their king that they could and would 
upset Rome’s dominion. The Gallic Wars did not end with Ariovistus’ defeat. Caesar 
still possessed four years of his proconsular command, and, having discovered one 
outside threat that could only be contained by enforcing Rome’s imperium up to major 
waterways, he would proceed to bring as much of Gallia circum Celtica under the city’s 
dominion as possible. For the next two years, he sought to complete this task of 
preventing another external threat to central Gaul from injuring Rome’s interests. In 58 
B.C, the Rhine, whose length Caesar had not yet measured, was a military and political 
foundation for such stability.
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CHAPTER THREE
SEPARATING THE RIGHT FROM THE LEFT 
Modern scholars observe that “ignorance, not knowledge of the world which she 
tried to conquer was most characteristic of Republican Rome.”99 Army campaigns were 
the chief means of encountering and identifying new peoples and lands during the 
period.100 Military commanders were typically of the highest social and political class, 
members of the Senate who had held one of the higher magistracies in Rome. Caesar’s 
proconsulship was unusual for its duration, initially five years, when the typical governor 
would only serve for one year. These short tenures in distant regions did not aid the 
gathering and dissemination of specialized knowledge because the governors were 
chiefly commanders campaigning relatively close to their provinces, within frontier 
zones. These elites campaigned partly for political purposes as a successful military 
venture provided a significant boost to personal prestige and status.101 If anything, they
>9 N. J. E. Austin and N. B. Rankov, Exploratorio: Military and Political Intelligence in the Roman World 
(London: Routledge, 1995), 99-112. The Republican system of independent, annual governors led only to 
fragmentary information based on existing concerns. The consolidation of territory into permanent 
provinces during the Principate changed this by encouraging mapping and supported a semi-permanent 
administrative staff. For this process, see Claude Nicolet, Space, Geography, and Politics in the Early 
Roman Empire (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1994), 129-175.
I<x> Susan P. Mattern, Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate (Berkeley: University o f  
California Press, 1999), 26-66. The Romans divided space via itineraries so the army was a major element 
in “discovering” new nations and regions. The time traveled and the public spectacle of the triumph was a 
key way of making them understandable to the Roman populace. On the other hand, tradition remained a 
powerful force even in intellectual pursuits, so not everyone consistently pursued the most accurate 
information in the face o f  older ideas.
101 William V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 BC (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1979), 21-26. Harris observes: “Through most o f the middle Republic about one consul in three celebrated
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concentrated on autobiographical accounts with ethnographic and geographic details 
rather than systematic descriptive texts.
Caesar was of consular rank and the BG was intended to serve a public purpose 
during his lifetime. Caesar set the Rhine as the boundary between the Galli and the 
Germani principally to settle the frontier issues that drew him into Gaul in 58 B.C. There 
was an ethnographic component in that the laws, customs, and language that he believed 
split the Gallic peoples among themselves likewise separated all of them from their 
eastern neighbors. The BG does not concentrate on these differences until later books, 
and the text does not again concentrate on the Germani or the Rhine until Book Four.
Caesar’s negative portrayal of Ariovistus in Book One was not to disguise any 
intent to cross the river himself in 58. Instead, the Roman army campaigned among the 
more familiar groups surrounding Celtica, including in the Alps, over the next two years. 
In 55 B.C., however, some Germani again attempted to cross the Rhine, this time further 
north, around the territory of the Belgae.* 102 Although Caesar had defeated some of the 
Belgae soon after defeating Ariovistus, this portion of Gaul and its inhabitants were still 
largely unfamiliar to Rome. In Book One, Caesar’s use of the river was political, 
separating communities within the frontier zone from newcomers that he deemed 
unreliable. This study now' turns to the BG's later books, especially Four, Five, and Six, 
which describe the second phase of Caesar’s contact with the Rhine from 55 to 53 B.C., 
along its upper reaches. The peoples within northeastern Gaul were of a mixed nature,
a triumph, either in his consulship or in his promagistracy.” The circumstances o f the Late Republic were 
different, o f course, but the triumph remained the premier way for an aristocrat to demonstrate his status.
102 Most o f the activity in the following three years takes place between the Seine and the Rhine rivers.51
typically Germanic in descent but Gallic in custom. The distinction between the two 
peoples marked by the Rhine increasingly a cultural one.
This chapter will concentrate on how Caesar identified the peoples along the 
Rhine from 55 to 53 B.C. The perceived features of racial and ethnic identity for Rome 
of the Late Republic, and more specifically Julius Caesar’s perception of it, will be the 
principal focus. This chapter contains two parts. The first is a general discussion of the 
characteristics that Romans of the Late Republic considered significant in identifying 
basic groups, or what a people were. The most basic characteristic, an assumed 
autochthony on a fixed piece of land has already been introduced. The second part of this 
chapter will study the specific characterizations of the Galli and Germani that Caesar 
advances and the Rhine’s place within the paradigm. As will be shown, Caesar outlines 
complex differences between the Galli and Germani in the later books of the BG in a 
systematic description, an element absent from Book One. It will be argued that, having 
decided that the Germani were too intractable, Caesar maintained his Rhine policy while 
adapting it beyond a political context.
Cornerstone -  The Gallic Community
The importance of the Galli in Roman history and political life has already been 
mentioned, as has Rome’s entrenchment in Gallic territory. The roving war horde of the 
fourth century B.C. was not Rome’s only experience of the Gauls by the mid-first 
century. Gallic oppida such as Bibracte or Vesontio had evolved from hill-forts into 
important trading and political centers, while most groups evidently organized oligarchic 
governments rather than chieftainships. ' Commerce between the Roman world and *
l(b T. Riche Holmes, Caesar’s Conquest o f Gaul, second edition (New York: AMS Press, 1971), 504-505.
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central Gaul steadily increased from the second century B.C. on, bringing trade goods, 
coinage, and ideas into the interior. The Galli nevertheless remained a prototypical, 
barbarian foe, the very embodiment of the uncivilized enemy for several hundred years of 
the Republic’s existence.104 Caesar combats this image in Book One with his portrayal of 
the Gallic leaders when he begins his argument against Ariovistus, but the BG possesses 
a strain of ambiguity regarding the Galli. Book One offered a significant point of 
difference between the Galli and the Germani -  as duplicitous as they could be, the Galli 
could be trusted in fidem, while the Germani could not. Ariovistus had crossed the Rhine 
into Gaul to war with the inhabitants, leading his Germani in a transgression of the 
frontier zone in both its geographic and political aspects.105 Ethnicity -  lingua, 
institutes, legibus -  played a small part in Caesar’s descriptions in his first three books. 
Overall, however, his identification of peoples relied upon politics, namely their ruler(s) 
and their relation to Rome, and geographical origin, expressed in the themes of 
autochthony and migration.
Caesar’s proconsular activities did not rely upon any pre-existing distinction
between Galli and Germani, although Book One insists upon some disparity between
them. The proconsul operated amid civitates (communities), the individually organized
Gallic groups consisting of clients, cantons, and similar subdivisions. The use of civitas
to describe the Galli is significant because it indicates how Caesar visualized the state of
Gallic society: politically organized towns with associated fields and a social system
104 Sail. Cat., 7. Put into the mouth o f Cato, he calls the Gauls “the bitterest foes of the Roman people.”
For how the Rhine functioned as a border during the Principate, see Claude Nicolet, Space, Geography, 
and Politics in the Early Roman Empire, 7-24, 189-190. Nicolet primarily discusses Agrippa’s map, one of 
the earliest attempts during the Principate to precisely describe the known world through representational 
units. This effort partly rested upon the connection between a land and its inhabitants, ties established by 
lineage and custom, and was the culmination of Republican thinking (itself derived from the ownership of 
land in Italy).
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centering on a public class of landowners, headed by prestigious offices, and unified by 
laws and custom. This structure was akin to the body politic of Italy.'06 These political 
and social characteristics were associated with settled agriculture, which was especially 
indicative of civilization (humanitas -  see below) to the Romans. Nomadism and 
pastoralism, on the other hand, implied barbarity. Gallic oppida were politically and 
economically central, and many of Caesar’s more dramatic battles were fought to control 
them. Once the site was held, the civitates was held, its aristocracy could be 
accommodated, and Rome’s dominion could grow. Nomadic hunter-herder-bandits, like 
Ariovistus, displaced the public class that patronized the settlements precisely because of 
their mobility. They had no moral ties to the land through history or cult (discussed 
below). The BG overwhelmingly speaks of civitates when indicating the Galli. In other 
words, Caesar describes the Galli in terms of politically and legally organized 
communities and not “tribal” units.
Common Latin words for foreign populations include civitas (community, 
citizenry, etc.), gens (tribe, family, line, etc.), and natio (nation, people).* 10708 Gens and 
natio are often synonymous and both were used to describe unknown and “barbaric”
ll>6 A. N. Sherwin-White, The Roman Citizenship, second edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 
5-25. Sherwin-White discusses the early development o f the Roman community, including its own 
hybridized origins and the role of affiliated peoples.
107 Notable battles included: Bibracte, the chief town o f the Aedui near where Caesar defeated the Helvetii; 
Vesontio, the citadel o f the Sequani where Caesar defeated Ariovistus; Alesia, the decisive “final” battle of 
the entire conflict. The oppida represented sufficient collections o f surplus capital that the Gauls actually 
could support Caesar’s troops during the winter months (a practice which was not well received, however). 
For the role of these settlements post-conquest, see J. F. Drinkwater, Roman Gaul (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1983), 11, 141-143; Kevin Greene, The Archaeology o f the Roman Economy (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1986), 160-167; Barry Cunliffe, The Oxford Illustrated Prehistory of 
Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 351-353. The Germani were not quite as migratory as 
Caesar suggests, as their reported numbers should indicate. Furthermore, primitive oppida (Halistadt 
period and earlier) exist well past the Rhine, but they did not develop to the point of those in Celtica. These 
sites are of varying date, but all from well before the first century.
108 Chariton Lewis, ed., A Latin Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879).
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peoples, with natio being the less loaded word. While natio indicates that a group had 
common characteristics or identity, gens strongly denotes blood relations, in terms of 
lineage (clan) or physical stock (race). The Aedui, for example, were a civitas because 
they had a distinct social order with leading men who formed a central authority for a 
disparate group of people ranging from a noble like Dumnorix to a dependent like one of 
his cavalrymen. The Aedui as a natio or gens would be a smaller group than the Aedui as 
a civitas because those relationships could not be extended by membership, such as the 
awarding of citizenship or acceptance as a client. The Romans identified their neighbors 
within the context of their social and political system. What mattered were the group’s 
relations to Rome, so the Aedui as a civitas would not necessarily consist of one ethnicity 
but rather the shared identity of their elite -  the nobles, senators, and equestrians. In 
broader terms, identity of the Aedui as a people, rather than a community, depended upon 
the fact that they were Galli. Explaining what the Galli were is not a priority of the BG, 
but it goes into great detail to outline who they were.
That Caesar prefers civitas over gens when identifying specific Gallic groups does 
more than dispel an old image of the Galli. It also places them at an intermediate stage of 
“otherness” compared to the Romans. This otherness was more than simple geographic 
unfamiliarity considering that Republican Rome was a ranked society. Social status 
requires a social hierarchy, so membership in city-centered communities, civitates, was a 
key component to Roman ideas of identity. Each community had a degree of prestige 
and privilege that membership provided. In addition, membership was itself ranked, with
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full citizenship providing the highest level of rights to property or services."D Roman 
law, for example, allowed various privileges to individuals based upon thetr level of 
citizneship. One advantage of Roman citizenship was that it permitted full access to 
Roman courts and shielded the possessor from abuse by magistrates, including 
execution.* 110 These types of privileges acted as checks on the imperium of officials and 
could boost an individual’s status within their own community. Relationships between 
communities had a similar hierarchy and included civhates sine suffragio, wherein the 
community members had the honor of nominal inclusion, the status of socios (military 
allies), and arnicitia, among others.111 12 Regardless of the specifics of membership or 
citizenship, the civitas was the source of political and social identity. By identifying the 
Gallic groups as communities instead of tribes, Ca’sar explicitly acknowledged that they 
had a place within these networks. An unaffiliated tribe (gens) might be a danger, but a 
civitas had a distinct identity formed from their relationship to Rome spelled out either in 
a treaty or by arrangement with a magistrate."2 The commonality involved in a civitas 
was much more complex than one of lineage or breeding group. It was political and 
social, giving the members an identity to outsiders and themselves, effectively saying 
who they were.
I<>9 See Joyce Reynolds, “Cities,” in Administration o f the Roman Empire, Exeter Stuides in History No. 18, 
ed. David C. Braud (Exeter: Short Run Press Ltd., 1988); Sherwin-White, The Roman Citizenship, 5-7.
110 In particular, Roman citizenship provided access to the law courts, rights regarding property (especially 
contracts), and protections against some punishments. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 
95-96; P. A. Brunt, The Fall o f the Roman Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 122-125. It also had 
its disadvantages at times such as during the Midthradatic wars when he encouraged Mediterranean pirates 
to harass the Romans specifically.
111 Sherwin-White, The Roman Citizenship, 165-169.
112 For the frontier, see Stephen L. Dyson, The Creation o f the Roman Frontier (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1985), especially 45-62 (the Veneti in northern Italy), 136-154 (the Arverni in continental 
Gaul); Sherwin-White, The Roman Citizenship, 20-25, 125-127.
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Perception -  W ay o f  life
If Rome in general and Caesar in particular dealt mostly with others on the basis 
of rank, they were aware of the larger, more abstract element of identity. The Roman 
worldview focused upon the past, making tradition the single greatest source of 
legitimacy.113 Lineage and autochthony -  a chain of descent in people and property -  
were among the most important factors in defining what a group was. Both Romans and 
Greeks sought the racial origins of the Gauls in ancestors or legendary figures and there 
was little consensus regarding the differences between Gaili and Germani during the 
Republic."4 Caesar consistently maintains a distinction in Book One, but does not 
systematically outline it until Book Six. His Rhine policy was political for it separated 
two groups based upon Rome’s interest and did not inherently involve the identity of the 
people beyond their collective membership in terms of civitates. This was one reason to 
equate a group and its leaders, or chieftain. Writing half a century later, Strabo, drawing 
upon Posidonius, proclaims “these two nations [Germani and Galli], both by nature and 
in their form of government, are similar and related to each other.”115 Caesar speculates 
as to Gallic origins, but offers no good genetic difference between the Galli and Germani, 
other than their respective occupation of territory relative to the Rhine.116 Other factors 
had a minor role in identification as well, but usually served to distinguish between two 
otherwise similar groups. The Romans were well aware that language, for example, 
could be acquired. While one’s language or dialect could increase one’s prestige or
113 Ronald Syme, The Roman Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), 149-161.
114 J. H. C. Williams, Beyond the Rubicon: Romans and Gauls in Republican Italy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 111-116.
115 Strabo Geogr., 4.4.2, transl. H. C. Hamilton, London, 1854. Strabo’s word for “nation” is the Greek 
ethnoi, which is comparable to the Latin natio.
'16 Caes. B Gall., 6.18; Strabo Geogr., 7.1.2.
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status within a community, class, or faction, it did not override membership as the main 
source of identity.117 Ariovislus spoke Gallic due to habit and not as a native, a detail 
that Caesar carefully notes.118 The parameters emphasized in the BG are not physical 
traits or even lineage, but rather cultural traits embodied in economic mode, political 
organization, and custom.
Caesar continually stresses the difference in the lifestyles between the Galli and
Germani in the BG. He learned of Gallic colonies east of the Rhine and explains them as
remnants of past Gallic vitality (in spirit). He goes on to declare that those colonists had
become as if Germani and, therefore, were Germanic themselves:
But during an earlier period, when the Galli suipassed the Germani in courage 
[v//?m.v], and because of great population and a need for land, they raided beyond 
[their borders] and sent colonies across the Rhine . . .  [some of these colonists] 
occupied and settled there . . . Now they endure the same helplessness, poverty, 
and suffering in which the Germani remain. They possess the same living [victus, 
probably “food,” but possibly broader] and clothing [culru corporis, “cultivation 
of the body”]. The Galli, however, in proximity to the province, knowing many 
goods from across the sea . . . The Galli gradually became accustomed to defeat 
and were conquered in many battles so that they do not believe themselves 
comparable in bravery with the Germani.119
117 J. N. Adams, “’Romanitas’ and the Latin Language,” Classical Quarterly (2003), 184-205. Cf.
J.P.V.D. Balsdon, Romans and Aliens (Chapel Hill: The University of Carolina Press, 1979), 44-46, 136- 
138; Brunt, The Fall of the Roman Republic, 114-118; Elizabeth Rawson, Intellectual Life in the Late 
Roman Republic (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1985), 19-37. Evidence points to a trend of 
nativism within the senatorial class during the Late Republic, in which Caesar may have been quite 
involved, see Lindsay G. H. Hall, “ ‘Ratio’ and ‘Romanitas’ in the Bellum Gallicum,” in Julius Caesar as 
Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as Political Instruments, ed. Kathryn Welch and Anton Powell 
(London: Gerald Duckworth and Co., Ltd., 1998). Hall suggests that Caesar, much like Cicero, promoted a 
genesis o f Latin material independent of Greek models, and also speculates that his intended audience was 
“middle Italy,” those o f some means outside the reigning political and social order that did not possess 
access to Greek or other cultural material. Cf. Elizabeth Rawson, “Lucius Crassus and Cicero: The 
Formation of a Statesman,” in Roman Culture and Society: Collected Papers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1991), 16-34. Rawson suggests that Hellenism was tied to the Sullan faction, with Marians (such as 
Caesar) promoting homegrown pursuits.
118 In dispatching his two final envoys to Ariovistus (after the face-to-face meeting), Caesar chose two 
provincials, one o f whom was fluent in Gallic. Caes. B Gall., 1.47.
119 Caes. B Gall., 6.24. Caesar is specifically speaking o f the Volcae Tectosages and the Hercynian Forest. 
While he does give some information on Greek knowledge of the specific group and their territory, he does 
question the relation between the specific group and the more general comparison he is making..
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In other words, the inner characteristic (virtus) depended upon cultural factors and 
material prosperity. Too much riches created the pathetic showing at the Gallic 
convention, but too littie had two drawbacks. The superior Gallic bravery became 
blunted by settling within new territory as the settlers, for lack of a better term, 
degenerated away from their own fields. It nonetheless remained at a superior state to the 
indolence that took hold of Gaul. The implication is that the two peoples, the Galli and 
the Germani, were not biologically distinct (gens) but different ethnicities (natio at least, 
civitas at best), defined not so much by lingua, institutes, and legibus (language, customs, 
and laws) as prosaic issues of what one ate and wore. The common element for these 
standards was political organization. The Galii organized themselves into civitates while 
the Germani did not. A civitas relied upon wealth, which meant agriculture, the 
traditional pastime of Rome’s elite.120
Agriculture consumed the Roman aristocracy to such a degree that one of Rome’s 
earliest literary fashions revolved around agricultural treatises, one of which specifically 
denied the equality of livestock with actual cultivation.121 Unsurprisingly, the Roman 
elite viewed their own values as the standard of civilization, which is to say that 
humanitas (civilization, culture) stemmed from urbanitas, respectable agriculture, and 
similar qualities.122 The values of the Roman elite originated in the management of
120 Cic. An., 1.16. Cicero describes the trial o f Clodius, whose jury was untrustworthy primarily because of  
their vulnerability to bribes (which occurred) due to poor character/fmances. He also compares the honest 
men with the robbers. The latter category largely consisted of recipients o f the dole who depended upon 
others for their livelihood, thus draining, not supporting, the public realm.
11 Keeping animals does not grow crops, and the growing of crops on estates was both artful and a science 
that could (with good land and in pleasing climate) provide happiness and security. Varro Rust., 1.2-1.4.
122 Greg Woolf, Becoming Roman, The Origins of Provincial Civilization in Gaul (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 55-59. Cf. Cic. Fam., 3.8. In his letter, Cicero mentions in passing that urbanem 
(“culture”) has replaced sapientem (“common-sense”) in aristocratic parlance. While probably an ironic 
joke, it still testifies to the value in fashion.
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property and expressed itself in the public realm where an individual was judged for his 
conduct while acting as a model for others. The public nature of conduct underscored 
Roman thoughts on morality and civilized behavior, especially libertas, the political 
freedom offered by citizenship to compete with peers for regard and status. Liberty 
consisted of the right to speak publicly in favor of political activities, including matters of 
peace and war.123 24 1256Liberty in turn was won and kept by those brave enough to maintain 
and defend the public realm as a whole, the public realm itself being an aggregate of 
property owned by the brave.123 Humanitas was theoretically obtainable by any people 
who adopted the civitas and mores necessary for this system. In a legal argument, Cicero 
claimed civilized beings (doctis, those having been taught) were ruled by reason while 
barbarians responded to necessity, and humankind as a whole, gentes, was ruled by 
custom, mos. ~ The mores as a whole depended upon age for respectability, propriety 
for validity, and the virtue of character. Qualities of note included honoring one’s 
ancestors by following their example, providing due to the deities through proper cultic 
practices, and the courage to defend one’s own property, and thus the collective property 
of one’s countrymen, on the battlefield. Overall, the Romans of the Late Republic 
perceived civilization as an acquired characteristic.
123 Cic. Pis., 16.37. Libertas is used metonymically for citizenship. Caesar often explains Gallic 
motivations in terms of concern for their own liberty, which may have indicated an underlying respect for 
them in that they were not “natural slaves” of certain Greek theories. See Benjamin Isaac, The Invention of 
Racism in Classical Antiquity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 414.
124 P. A. Brunt, The Fall o f the Roman Republic, 296-297, 328-239, 349-350.
125 Sail. Cat., 6.
126 Cic. Mil., 11.30. The context of the argument involves political violence. It has been suggested that 
Cicero’s paradigm was a matter of political effectiveness. Luxury and servitude, which brought inevitable 
deterioration, could lead to the moral improvement o f some. This improvement was not equality but 
advancement to an intermediate position o f worth with credit for the change going to the state and those 
controlling it. Isaac, The Invention o f Racism in Classical Antiquity, 87-89, 184-186.
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By explicitly and continually describing the peoples of Gaul in terms familiar to 
the Romans, Caesar identified the Galli as participants within the res publico. With 
Caesar as patron, their greater development would become recognized, heightening their 
status within Rome's eyes. Meanwhile, the negative image could go to the people 
juxtaposed to the Galli, the Germani. The appellation of “barbarian" was the most 
negative expression of a people in Latin. The BG employs it rarely and almost never to 
refer to the Galli.127 If barbarian meant uncivilized in habit and custom, then Caessar’s 
usage is consistent w-ith a Gaul not too different from Italy.128 Their fides -  the Galli’s 
adherence to the obligations inherent within their relationship to Rome -  was also a 
factor. By accepting diplomatic relations with Rome, the Galli accepted obligations to 
provide resources and to accede to the “power and dominion of the Roman people."129 
The Galli had proved dutiful in Book One and Caesar takes pains not to portray them as 
otherwise.130
Lest it seem disingenuous, Caesar’s use of civitas likely came naturally because 
of real characteristics of the Gallic population. The archaeological record clearly shows 
that the Galli did possess a way of life similar to that of the Mediterranean in the first 
century. Their settlements, oppida, were centers of economic activity, fcr both local
127 Caes. B Gal!.. 1.31, 1.33 (both describing Ariovistus); 1.40 (the Germani); 1.44 (Ariovistus, evidently 
meaning ‘ignorant’); 2.35 (the Germani); 4.10 (referring to insular peoples); 4.17 (the Germani); 4.21 (the 
Britons); 4.22 (Galli calling themselves barbarians as an excuse); 4.23, 4.25, 4.34 (the Britons); 5.34 (the 
Eburones, a group of Belgae, in the context o f guerilla tactics); 5.54 (Galli, evidently meaning ‘rebellious’ 
or ‘belligerent’); 6.10 (the Suebi, evidently meaning ‘ignorant’); 6.29 (the Germani); 6.34 (the Eburones, in 
the context o f  guerilla tactics); 6.35, 6.37, 6.39-6.41 (the Germani). This survey is not exhaustive, but it 
demonstrates the various connotations of the word as well as Caesar’s reluctance to use it for the Gaili.
Williams, Beyond the Rubicon, ! 11-128. The traditional Republican image of the Galli in the second 
century B.C. was nomadic. They represented the untamed wilderness opposed to the Greek (and Roman) 
lifestyle o f  ordered communities. This stereotype remained into the Principate, even for Roman citizens, 
but without its intellectual validity.
129 Cic. Font., 5.12.
130 He nevertheless often cautions about the excitability of the Galli, for example: Caes. B Gall., 2.3.
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production and long-distance bulk trade.1' 1 Property owners, with Equestrian friends in 
Rome to provide loans, could challenge traditional chieftainships based on prestige goods 
and raiding for political power. ' “ Gallic manners were becoming more urbane, with 
some, such as Diviciacus, being especially close to Rome. Others, like his brother 
Dumnorix, continued to adhere to the o'der style, and these chieftairs gained less from 
contemporary ties with Rome. In short, the Galli of Celtica in 58 B.C. were civilized 
under the Roman paradigm, t he migrating Germani were not. A political border at first, 
the Rhine would become an ethnographic dividing point during the second phase of 
operations, beginning in 55.
Caesar might have thought well of Gallic sophistication, but he thought poorly of 
Gallic character. According to the BG, the Gauls were “impulsive and sudden in their 
decision-making,” “quick to take decisions and even eager for political change,” and 
never forgot their “ancient reputation for war.”13 233 If one accepts Caesar’s basic portrayal 
of Gallic divisions, such as those described in the convention of Book One, Caesar’s 
decisions make political sense. His campaigns generally settled matters within Gaul. 
From 55 to 53 B.C. Caesar campaigned on either side of the Upper Rhine, repeatedly at 
odds with hybridized groups like the Eburones (Belgic) and the Treveri. This second 
phase of Rhine activity included a major revolt by the Treveri and their allies in the 
winter of 54 that was one of the most dangerous potential setbacks during the Gallic 
Wars. This revolt, shortly before the more famous Gallic uprising led by Vercingetorix
131 Cic. Font., 9.19; Cunliffe, The Oxford Illustrated Prehistory of Europe, 429. The effect o f this, of 
course, was that Rome could conquer people who reiied upon specific sites for defense, and integrate 
people who might aspire to similar municipal positions.
132 Dyson, The Creation o f the Roman Frontier, 164-170.
133 Caes. B Gall.. 3.8, 4.5, 5.54, transl. Caroiyn Hammond, Oxford, 1996. The difficulty o f maintaining 
pro-Roman rulers is a subdued but recurring theme.
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(in 52), consisted of those "the furthest away from the civilization and culture of the 
province."134 *In other words, the utility of Caesar’s identifications was tested in similar 
circumstances to their creation. Ideas related to lifestyle, origins, and martial strength 
would intersect with Caesar’s use of the Rhine to make it an ethnographic division.
Caesar and the Rhine -  Intervening Years 
If the campaign against Ariovistus saw the creation of the Rhine policy, 
subsequent events cemented it. Caesar continued to secure the frontier zone by 
campaigning against border peoples other than the Germani. Caesar moved his men into 
winter quarters within the territory of the Sequani and personally departed for Italy, as he 
had other responsibilities there. Most commentators see his garrisoning of troops within 
Gallic territory, rather than the province, as a provocation to the Belgae, the inhabitants at 
the further end of the area.133 Some argue that this and his subsequent campaigns were 
due to Caesar’s personal ambitions for a second consulship in Rome, and that the BG's 
characterizations of the Gauls reflect Caesar’s pretexts for further involvement.136 137If 
Caesar was acting in typical proconsular fashion, he would seek a deditio from each 
belligerent group, and establish explicit ties with any others, in effect expanding the 
frontier. ' The motive for wintering in conquered territory was likely to secure the
134 Caes. B Gall., 1.1, transl. Carolyn Hammond, Oxford, 1996.
L'5 Caes. B Gall., 1.54-2.3. Caesar gives several for the Belgic revolt. Perhaps most significantly, Caesar 
notes that the Belgae were stirred by Galli who did not want Rome to threaten them like the Germani did 
(and again inclusive language: “Germanos . . .  in Gallia”)- In other words, he implied a frontier threat.
136 Jane F. Gardner, "The ‘Gallic Menace’ in Caesar’s Propaganda,” Greece & Rome (October, 1983), 181- 
189; for a more cultural view, see Louis Rawlings, “Caesar’s Portrayal of Gauls as Warriors,” in Julius 
Caesar as Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as Political Instruments, ed. Kathryn Welch and Anton 
Powell (London: Gerald Duckworth and Co., Ltd., 1998).
137 In this respect, the Gallic Wars appear almost a microcosm of Roman imperialism in general, as "some 
real but not very formidable dangers to its outlying possessions, [caused Rome to react] with such force 
that not only were these possessions secured but extensive and valuable new ones were acquired.” Harris 
War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 211.
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frontier against further attack and ensure the integrity of the Sequani, as they occupied a 
roadway into Gaul. Whether, as Caesar claimed, his campaign against the Belgae was 
pre-emptive, even a victory against some octhem made the frontier more secure by 
discouraging interference with Caesar's dispositions. The Rhine does not feature as 
prominently in Book Two as Book °oe, but its evolution into an ethnographic 
determinant began with the challenge of the Belgae.
Caesar’s new opponents had several characteristics of note. They were a people 
of Germanic descent that had occupied their territory generations before and were 
remembered for having repelled the Cimbri.1 The Belgae were hybridized in that they 
had mixed identities with a Gallic way of life yet clearly of different lineage than the 
frontier zone Galli. The political nature of Caesar’s distinction again appears after the 
defeat of one of the Belgic civitates in the field against Caesar in 57 B.C. At Diviciacus’ 
urging, Caesar showed leniency to the Bellovaci at least partly because “the Bellovaci 
were forever faithful and on friendly terms with the community of the Aedui (Bellovacos 
omni. tempore, in fide atque amicitia civitatis Haeduae fuisse)."1'9 The important factor 
for the proconsul was the web of relationships tying the frontier peoples to Rome, and 
diplomatic attachment to the Aedui could trump ethnic or racial attachment to the Belgae. 
This campaign had a benefit for Caesar as well in that he could employ his patronage to 
make the Belgic Remi a second pillar of Rome’s security in Gaul.
Caesar’s second year ends so successfully that he feels secure in rebuffing envoys 
from across the Rhine, whom the Belgae evidently courted: “The fame of this war spread 1389
138 Caes. B Gall., 2.4. The recall of the Cimbri on this occasion emphasizes the Belgae’s strength, which 
becomes explicit with the list o f peoples and soldiers that follows it. The inventory (2.5 ) is atypical for the 
BG.
139 Caes. BGall., 2.14.
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among the barbarians [ad barbaros - those outside the frontier, likely the rest of the 
Belgae], and was so impressive that the peoples living on the other side of the Rhine 
[nationibus . .. trans Rhenum] sent envoys to Caesar; they promised to send hostages and 
t > obey his commands.”1 *° The following year (56 B.C.), there was a brief struggle with 
communities in the Alps over the passes into Gaul. Caesar afterwards thought he “had 
every reason to think that the whole of Gaul had been subdued.” The Acquitani, living 
southeast of Celtica, were the final group on the fringes oi ne frontier to pose any sort of 
threat, so Caesar returned to Gaul even as his legati did most of the campaigning. This 
would be his last attempt to leave as he decided to secure Britannica next.140 42 In 55, 
however, the Usipetes and Tencteri crossed the Rhine, drawing Caesar back to that part 
of Gaul.
Phase Two -  The Rhine Policy Revisited 
There are two specific events discussed in the BG where Caesar concentrates on 
the contrast between Gallus and Germanus. The first is his campaign against Ariovistus, 
which led to the creation of his Rhine policy. After departing the convention of the 
Gallic leaders, Caesar conducted forced marches to the fortified city of Vesontio in 
anticipation of Ariovistus’ advance. Once there, his legati — those young men of good 
birth, high class, or close friendship who sought political ties or advancement through 
military experience -  nearly sparked a mutiny. They panicked after hearing traders and
140 Caes. B Gall., 2.35, transl. Carolyn Hammond, Oxford, 1996. Whichever group this incident refers to, 
Caesar seems to consider this moment the end of any direct threat to the frontier.
141 Caes. B Gall., 3.7, transl. Carolyn Hammond, Oxford, 1996.
142 Caes. B Gall., 4.20. The trip to Britain seems to be somewhat opportunistic, a consequence of his 
fighting with the Veneti. Somewhat confusingly, Caesar claims that Britons aided his enemies (which 
would fit with his duty to ensure frontier security) while also saying that the Galli knew little about the 
island. Strabo suggests that Caesar sparked the conflict by endangering the Veneti trade monopoly. Strabo 
Geogr., 4.4.1.
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the Sequani described the strength, size, skiii, and bravery of the coming Germani. 
Caesar shamed the army as a whole into holding firm, largely by emphasizing the 
superiority of valor (especially Roman virtus) over the lesser quality of cunning, which 
had been enough to defeat the Gauls.143 44 This lesser quality, possessed in abundance by 
the Germani, did not indicate humanitas as valor did, perhaps because it lacked the 
connection to property and the moral fiber of those willing to defend it (and thus the 
state). The mutiny not only let the BG emphasize the ultimate military virtue of Romans, 
it also added to the characterization of the Germani as chaotic bandits. They might be 
strong and skillful, but they did not have the military virtue of Rome or even the Galli. 
The proper, valorous way to fight was in pitched battles facing the enemy -  virtus was 
important because it was the spirit to stand one’s ground in a thunderous and bloody 
melee, flight from which could be suicidal.145 The Helvetii fought openly, in a phalanx, 
as did the Belgae and others with sufficient bravery to defend themselves and their 
propeHy.146 Although Caesar consistently claims that the fighting spirit of the Germani 
was the greater, theirs was the quality of fierceness (feri).
The second incident, the arrival of the Usipetes and Tencteri, pulled Caesar back 
to the Rhine in 55 B.C., which would remain his principal theatre of operations for the 
next two years (excepting his expeditions to Britain). It is worth reemphasising that
143 Caes. B Gall., 1.39.
144 Caes. B Gall., 1.40; Sail. Cat., 37. The Romans generally equated martial character, especially valor, 
with moral worth. They were proud of their willingness to assist their allies (socii), form military pacts 
(foeda), and avenge their friends (anticitia).
145 Nathan Rosenstein, Imperatores Victi; Military Defeat and Aristocratic Competition in the Middle and 
Late Republic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 95-132.
146 Polybius describes the Celtic infantry as fighting naked or with a light cloak, as does Tacitus the 
German infantry. Caesar describes both the Helvetians and Ariovistus’ Germans as fighting in a phalanx ~  
a well-ordered formation o f Greek origin that must have been universal in Gaul by that time. There appears 
to be a clash of images, horde versus army, which spans at least two and a half centuries. Polybius is the 
most detailed and the earliest. See Polyb., 2.28-2.29.
66
Caesar was the first Roman governor to campaign beyond the groups of Celtica. Within 
the frontier zone, Caesar operated within an established web of ties with many of the 
groups -  the Aedui and Aliobroges, in particular -  who had long standing relations with 
Rome. In the expanded campaigns around Celtica, he strengthened Rome’s position by 
patronizing the Remi, forging another pillar to support an expanded frontier zone, and 
supporting various leaders in other civitates. One of the stronger groups in northeastern 
Gaul, the Treveri, were not as easily won over. They had allies of their own and like the 
Sequani occupied territory adjacent to the Rhine. The Usipetes and Tencteri, entering 
Gaul either because of invitations by the Treveri or possibly pressure from the Suebi, 
were initially willing to come on Rome’s terms, much as the Helvetii had offered. Caesar 
rejected the Germani’s offer as he had that of the Helvetii, although he made a more 
complete example in 55 with his total massacre of these newcomers in a surprise 
attack.147 The arrival of the Usipetes and Tencteri sparked a renewed focus on the Rhine 
and the peoples near it that would culminate in a systematic attempt to distinguish 
between Gallus and Germanus.
As proconsul, Caesar possessed the authority to carry war as far as necessary to 
ensure Roman security and dominion. The matter of the Usipetes and Tencteri convinced 
him to stem the flow of Germani by crossing the Rhine himself: “now that he had seen 
how easily the German[i] were induced to invade Gaul [ut in Gallium venirent], he
147 Caes. B Gall., 4.13-4.15. He stuck to his Rhine policy (4.8): “there could be no friendship between 
them and himself if they remained in Gaul.” The campaign against Ariovistus had been politically 
difficult, but Caesar’s slaughter of the migrants, whether out of ambition (he was preparing to invade 
Britain) or as an example to other groups, evidently brought home more criticism. His excuse, that they 
broke the truce first with a cavalry raid, has not generally been accepted. See Anton Powell, “Julius Caesar 
and the Presentation o f Massacre,” in Julias Caesar as Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as 
Political Instruments, ed. Kathryn Welch and Anton Powell (London: Gerald Duckworth and Co., Ltd., 
1998).
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wanted them to experience fear on their own account -  when they realized that the army 
of the Roman people was both capable of crossing the Rhine and brave enough to venture 
it.”148 14950Caesar emphasizes the security problem through his pursuit of the surviving 
Germanic cavalry, whose continued existence made the victory (and massacre) 
incomplete.140 In accordance with Roman dignitas, Caesar decided not to cross by boats, 
a means typical of his opponents, but by constaicting a bridge -  a monument that could 
demonstrate Rome’s ability and willingness to take war to the enemy anywhere the 
enemy called home.1'80 The invasion lasted several days, but Caesar withdrew after 
inflicting little damage, largely due to reports that the Suebi were gathering.181 He would 
similarly withdraw from Germania in a second campaign during the revolt of the Treveri 
and their allies two years later while blaming supply problems.152
These Roman counter-invasions highlight two important facts. First, Caesar 
revisited his Rhine policy in 55 B.C. partly because of the similar circumstances to those 
in 58, with the political character of the frontier being of considerable importance.
Caesar encountered one Germanic group in his forays across the Rhine which acquiesced
148 Caes. B Gall., 4.16, transl. Carolyn Hammond, Oxford, 1996. It is notable that Caesar does not describe 
the territory he is entering as Germania, and his envoys demand the surrender of those whom had attacked 
“himself and Gaul.”
149 The practice of eliminating all belligerents one way or another was typical. In the Gallic War o f 125- 
121 B.C., for example, the conflict grew to include the Allobroges specifically because they aided Rome’s 
enemies.
150 Caes. B Gall., 4.17. The invasion apparently had the desired effect, as the Treveri could not attract any 
Germanic support in the next year when the real conflagration began. For Caesar’s manner o f fighting, see 
Adrian Goldsworthy, ‘“Instinctive Genius’ The Depiction of Caesar the General,” in Julius Caesar as 
Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as Political Instruments, ed. Kathryn Welch and Anton Powell 
(London: Gerald Duckworth and Co., Ltd., 1998).
151 Caes. B Gall., 4.19. transl. Carolyn Hammond, Oxford, 1996. “(TJhinking he had advanced far enough 
to serve both honor and interest. . . ” He ravaged the countryside, to little more than perhaps psychological 
effect. Cf. Strabo Geogr., 7.2.1; Malcolm Todd, The Northern Barbarians 100 BC -  AD 300 (London: 
Hutchinson & Co. Ltd, 1975), 112-116. Ancient authors sometimes imply that German villages consisted 
of nothing but wagons. Archaeological studies have demonstrated “enduring communities” but confirmed 
a significantly lower concentration of people and buildings in areas immediately to the west of the Rhine.
152 Caes. B Gall., 6.29.
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to his patronage. The Ubii were by their own admission of Germanic lineage and lived 
east of the Rhine, but because they accepted Caesar’s authority and gave hostages during 
his first invasion he treated them as friendly parties in both invasions. Any group that 
accepted the commands of Rome’s representative ceased to be a frontier threat. The 
second fact revolves around military virtue. Caesar may have withdrawn in 55 because 
he found little to fight over -  he mentions “inciting fear in the [offending] Germani” and 
accepting offers of friendship from others, but departs when learning of more gathering to 
attack. ' '  He almost certainly withdrew in 53 to avoid a repeat of his experiences with 
the Eburones during the revolt of 54. These experiences included grueling irregular 
warfare for which the Romans were ill-equipped -  the quintessential “barbarian” tactic of 
relying on cunning and not courage. Instead of forming his lines to allow the scattered 
enemy to pick off individual soldiers, Caesar moved cautiously and kept his forces in 
loose groups -  “Caesar preferred to overlook a chance to inflict injury . . .  rather than 
inflict it but do some harm to his soldiers in the process.”1™ In neither case did Caesar 
advance into a potentially disastrous and unnecessary engagement with the Suebi. The 
Rhine policy was always centered on maintaining control of Gaul and not on fighting the 
Germani. Roman forces would fight to protect or expand Rome’s interests, but unless the 
Germani crossed the Rhine or formed a proper battle line Caesar apparently had other 
priorities. 153*
153 Cues. B Gall., 4.17-4.19.
1,4 Caes. B Gall., 6.34, transl. Carolyn Hammond, Oxford, 1996. This passage offers one of the few 
instances where the BG measures the value of one group directly against another. Caesar defeated the 
Eburones by calling for Gallic reinforcements to attack their territory while they kept him on the defensive: 
“In this way the lives of Ga[l!i], rather than those of legionary soldiers, were put at risk in the woods.”
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Civilization -  Degrees of Difference
The BG includes descriptions of peoples and customs throughout its narrative, but 
the concentration of such material increases in the later books (Four, Five, and Six) when 
Caesar is almost always in less familiar territory. Specialists like Strabo might employ (if 
not accept) general “racial” categories originating in a theory of climatological 
determinism, in which case the Germani were viewed as larger, fiercer, and ruddier than 
the Galli, yet otherwise much the same.155 The peoples of the colder northern zone were 
perceived to possess limited intelligence, impulse control, or craft ability, and tall frames, 
pale faces, and deep voices.156 A people’s perceived mores was another standard, and 
orators might concentrate on racial stereotypes that drew from a fairly common set of 
negative qualities.'57 In either case, the new people would be known in some basic sense 
that implied a distinctiveness of physical form and general habit. Distinctiveness in 
whatever sense might attract the interest of the intellectual gentry with the promise of 
quaint customs or an unusual pedigree.158 The BG was a rhetorical document and its 
overwhelmingly political focus reflects Caesar’s concern for his relations to Gallic 
groups upon whom he was at times reliant for material support.
155 Strabo Geogr., 4.7.2. The belief that environment determined some characteristics of the native peoples 
remained dominant throughout Classical times. The Mediterranean was of course the best, allowing them 
(especially the Romans) to have the most effective balance of strength and intelligence.
156 Balsdon, Romans and Aliens, 60; for the Galli, see Strabo Geogr., 4.2; for the Germani, see Isaac, The 
Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity, 427-439. Strabo implies the theory in his overarching 
description o f the Galli, whiie Isaac argues that, through Roman history as a whole, the Germani are the 
archetype of the northerner.
157 Cic. Scaur., 17.33. One of the more scathing descriptions of provincials, Cicero makes frequent uses of 
stereotypes such as untrustworthiness, complacency, and similar. Although his principal subject is Sardinia 
(he is defending his brother, Quintus, from charges o f corruption), he compares the “national character” of 
several groups.
158 Cic. Q Fr., 2.16, transl. D. R. Shackleton Bailey, New York, 1986. Talking about Britain to his brother, 
Cicero says: “You evidently have some splendid literary material -  the places, the natural phenomena and 
scenes, the customs, the peoples you fight, and, last but not least, the commander-in-chief!”
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The Gaiii were ultimately those peoples in Gaul, and Gaul was in turn the region 
inhabited by Galli. Although circular, such close association fit into Roman ideas of 
autochthony. A group inhabiting a piece of land for an extended period of time would 
possess legitimizing cultural traditions that connected the public order with their 
ancestors. The idea of the pax deorum was in this vein because the chain of ancestors 
would inspire the best men, those land-owning aristocrats who had property to defend 
and the virtue to do so, to follow their example in all custom.., including the proper cultic 
conduct which pleased the gods and brought prosperity. The social and political system 
embodied in the civitas, its economic foundation, and the connections between 
communities all indicated a moral order best realized by continuity in mores. Cicero, for 
example, insisted that:
Nor indeed can any man think otherwise, unless there be any who thinks that 
there is no such thing as divine power and control, who is not stirred by the 
greatness of our empire or . . .  by the wisdom of our ancestors, who themselves 
paid strict observance to worship and rights and auspices, and have handed them 
on to us their descendents.159
For Caesar, the test was not actually descent -  the Belgae, Treveri, and others 
were of Germanic pedigree and Caesar was aware of Gallic communities in what he 
identified as Germania. The key was the perceived way of life. West meant Gallia, 
agriculture, commerce, humanitas, and dominion of Rome, while East meant Germania, 
herding, no commerce, a sort of simplicity, and a fierce, independent spirit. It is these 
themes that Caesar ties to his Rhine policy to distinguish Germani from Galli.
1:19 Cic. Milo., 31.1, transl. N. H. Watts, London, 1931. Religious rites had an important place in Roman 
public life. See P. A. Brunt, Social Conflicts in the Roman Republic (New York: W. W. Norton and 
Company, 1971), 58-67; Elizabeth Rawson, “Religion and Politics in the Late Second Century B.C. at 
Rome,” in Roman Culture and Society: Collected Papers, 149-168.71
In 58 B.C., one chieftain with his followers caused grave disruption within Gaul. 
Caesar took extreme measures to prevent a similar occurrence in 55, to no avail. In 54, 
the Treveri added their strength to a string of revolts near the Rhine. This revolt, 
occurring between Caesar’s two counter-invasions, proved especially dangerous because 
Germanic assistance did materialize. Coordinated attacks by several groups nearly 
succeeded in eliminating the Roman army’s winter quarters, and inflicted considerable 
casualties. The Nervii, a community whom Caesar more than once thought defeated, 
contributed to the revolt and almost overran the camp commanded by Cicero’s brother, 
Quintus.160 With the exception of the Caesar’s first invasion in Book Four, the BG tends 
to detail the individual Gallic civitates while treating the Germani as a single force until 
the revolt of the Treveri in Book Five. This revolt in 54 would lead to a new emphasis on 
cultural characteristics over geographic origin for identification. The topical change 
occurring in Books Five and Six is especially striking because the two books are 
continuous. The story seamlessly connects during the winter of 54. A dedicated 
ethrographic portion first appears in Book Six, which splits the narrative and 
conveniently draws the audience’s attention from Caesar’s second retreat from the 
relatively new Germania (first called such in Book Four).161 The BG now juxtaposes the
,<K' Caes. B Gall., 2.28 (“almost wiped out”), 5.39-45 (they resurge in sufficient strength to besiege Quintus 
Cicero’s winter camp), 6.3 (Caesar defeats them in one lightning strike), 7.75 (Vercingetorix levied 5,000 
men from the Nervii for his army). The Nervii were one of the newly encountered groups, as Cicero’s 
correspondence (54 B.C.) indicates: “For I don’t know where your Nervii live or how distantly from us.” 
Cic. Q Fr., 3.6. The Nervii had attacked Quintus and almost overwhelmed his camp during the revolt of 
54. Cicero is an important case, for he had at one time (in 59) prepared to write his own geography, so one 
might assume he would have the best information during his time. Cic. Att., 2.6.
161 T.P. Wiseman, “The Publication of the De Bello Gallico,” in Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter: The War 
Commentaries as Political Instruments, ed. Kathryn Welch and Anton Powell (London: Gerald Duckworth 
and Co., Ltd., 1998). A similar concern likely caused Book Five to end in the “middle” of the action. As 
an interesting aside, this section also includes interesting trivia like a bestiary. The inclusion of such 
broader curiosities may have been to dilute the audience’s expectation of a battle with the Suebi that never 
comes.
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Gerrnani and Gal 1 i as ethnographic groups instead of individual civitates, and 
generalizations that sporadically appeared in earlier books, particularly the description of 
the Suebi, become summarized.162 The ethnographic portion expands older stereotypes 
with additional details of the peoples and their customs.
Following the differences described in the section, Caesar’s standard refrain 
gains increasing strength: the Galli were more civilized than the Gerrnani, with the Rhine 
separating the two groups. Where the Galli were viewed in terms of civitates, the 
Gerrnani had only the most basic political system of magistrates and leading men uniting 
clans.163 164Access to traders, the cultivation of land, and the aristocratic culture promoted 
by such economic activities clearly marked the two peoples as separate. Caesar described 
the descent of the Galli, as given by the druids, from the deity Dis (Pluto), indicating 
autochthony. While this could be claimed for the Galli of Celtica, hybridized peoples 
like the Treveri clearly could not claim the same lineage. The ethnographic section of 
Book Six does not address them directly, but strongly implies that all groups west of the 
Rhine were more Galli than Gerrnani.'64 The Rhine was now seen to divide peoples in 
terms of their ethnic identity -  or their lingua, institutes, legibus -  and Caesar examines 
the basic organizational traits of Gallic societies versus those of the Germanic.
152 Caes. B Gall., 4.1. This has occasionally been advanced as a proof from internal evidence as to the 
BG's periodic composition because it indicates more specific knowledge as the Books progress.
163 Caes. B Gall., 6.22, 6.24.
164 This implication is perhaps strongest when Caesar suggests reasons for the Gerrnani to avoid private 
land ownership. Caes. B Gall., 6.22, transl. Carolyn Hammond, Oxford, 1996: “to prevent people [from] 
adopting agriculture in place o f . . .  war; or trying to obtain large estates, the strong driving the weak out of 
their properties; or building too carefully with the intention of avoiding extreme cold and heat; or to stop 
the desire for money springing up, for from this arise factions and dissent; or finally, to keep the ordinary 
people content, since each man can see that his own possessions are equal to those of the men in power.” 
Not only are many o f these reasons actual features o f the Roman view o f hurnanitas that seems reflected in 
the Gallic way of life, but if  one assumes a very close, even determinative, correlation between agriculture 
and such traits, then most o f the Beigae, Britons, Acquitani and the like would seem more similar to the 
Galli of Celtica.
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If one recalls the pax deoritm, it comes as no surprise that the BG includes 
religion as part of its comparison. The Galli were clearly more like the Romans in 
Caesar's treatment with easy identification between deities. The Galli were deeply 
religious and worshipped a cross-section of the Olympians: Mercury, the divine 
messenger with strong commercial associations, was foremost, implying Gallic 
involvement in trade; Apollo, whom Caesar explicitly associates with medicine, but may 
be implying other attributes such as poetry, indicating a certain sophistication in science 
and art; Mars, the god of war to whom the Galli dedicated all their spoils and sacrificial 
victims, recalling their previous fame in war, now lessened; Jupiter, a deity of the 
heavens, perhaps implying cosmic order and thus order within their own societies; and 
finally Minerva, goddess of wisdom and craft skills, indicating some level of technical 
skill.165 In describing their basic religious practices only in terms of Roman gods, Caesar 
can imply among the Galli practices familiar to his audience while suggesting the quality 
of pietas, a positive quality related to one fulfilling one’s responsibilities within society 
much as fides governed foreign agreements. The comparison with Germanic spiritual 
practices is especially telling, because according to Caesar they did not worship deities 
beyond those which they could see, such as fire or the sun.166 Thus, through the objects 
of their devotion, the Galli display a degree of humanitas that the Germani do not.
165 Caes. B Gall., 6.18. This passage may not be anything more than what it is, and most scholars accept it 
as Caesar identifying Celtic deities by their Roman equivalents. Mars and Jupiter would be expected in this 
case, but Mercury and Minerva at least imply a relatively sophisticated economy. It is possible that Caesar 
is actually characterizing the Galli by personifying their way of life through their deities. Either way, it 
likely made the Galli more familiar than before through association. Many o f these embody Gallic 
characteristics that have already been discussed, but their technical skills would become an issue in the 
revolt o f Vercingetorix in 52 B.C.
166 Caes. B Gall., 6.21. Also, they “have no druids to preside over religious matters.” Without informed 
worship o f the gods, they lacked Rome’s ability to determine heaven’s will (fas) through any but the most 
basic means, as Ariovistus did in waiting for favorable divination prior to engaging Caesar (1.50).
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Other traits also mark the difference between the two peoples. A secure frontier 
was necessary because the Gauls were flighty. This trait coexisted with the good sense to 
restrict certain information to their elite, to organize themselves behind patrons, and to 
protect property brought to a marriage, all of which were also venerable Roman 
customs.167 Many evidently knew Latin or Greek which also emphasizes their 
participation within the Greco-Roman world.168 Outside of farming, commerce is the 
economic activity most frequently cited by Caesar, and his earliest description of the 
Galli included the indirect relationship between trade and a people’s martial quality.169 
Prejudices against excessive luxury aside, Caesar's emphasis on trade reinforced the 
achievement of humanitas and the formation of civitates tied to of Rome.170 The core of 
the ancient prejudice blamed physical pleasures and soft living, characterized especially 
by wine, for a people’s degradation in fighting ability.171 Yet even among the most 
belligerent, such as the Treveri, sociopolitical stability encouraged wealth via trade over 
the Germanic habit (and ideal) of daring banditry.172 The Germani did not allow private 
ownership of land, nor did they practice true agriculture. They instead subsisted on
167 Caes. B Gall., 6.19-20.
168 Caes. B Gall., 1.29, 5.48, 6.14. Caesar gives several examples of Greek “letters,” which may or may not 
mean the actual language.
169 Caes. B Gall., 1.1. Cf. Strabo Geogr., 4.4.1; Balsdon, Romans and Enemies, 66; Cunliffe, The Oxford 
Illustrated Prehistory of Europe, 350-353. The flow o f goods was not quite as simplistic as Caesar 
maintained, and the difference was one o f an economy o f prestige goods versus trade in bulk, especially of 
wine and animals. The Romans likely borrowed this association from the Greeks (who said much the same 
about the Macedonians and others). See Williams, Beyond the Rubicon, 61.
170 Cunliffe, The Oxford Illustrated Prehistory o f Europe, 428. Following the trail of material goods, the 
“real” frontier lay nearer the Elbe not the Rhine, as Caesar seems to discover when meeting the Ubii.
171 Catherine Torigian, “The Logos of Caesar’s Bellum Gallicum especially as revealed in its First Five 
Chapters,” in Julius Caesuras Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as Political Instruments, ed. 
Kathryn Welch and Anton Powell (London: Gerald Duckworth and Co., Ltd., 1998). Torigian suggests 
that the relationship with wine and military spirit was intended to promote Roman superiority. The 
Romans, despite consuming such goods, could still defeat those who did not consume them.
172 Caes. B Gall., 1.18, 4.2, 6.23. Dumnorix gained much o f his wealth and influence from control o f taxes 
and tolls, a position that required the awarding of public contracts as much as armed force. The Germani 
had no political superstructure and little interest in traders except to sell slaves, not even for pack animals. 
Thus, contact between Rome and the Germani would Mkeiy always be conflict.
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hunting and herding, “clothing" themselves in skins and consuming meat and milk.'7<
The same paradigm was applied to Britain where “the most civilized are those who live 
in Kent . . .  their way of life is much the same as that of the Ga[lli]” and “inland, the 
people for the most part do not plant corn-crops, but live on milk and meat and clothe 
themselves in animal skins.”173 74 In other words, as far as the BG is concerned, the Galli 
are civilized compared to any other group Caesar encounters, and their way of life was 
typified by their social and economic practices.
Two Classes -  Divisions Among the Galli 
For all his rhetoric against the Germani, Caesar most often fought against the 
Galli, and he ascribed certain unflattering characteristics to them. One theme, introduced 
in Diviciacus’ speech, is the bipolar nature of Gallic life. There were two factions to 
everything. This claim of constant division conveniently reduces the threatening image 
of the Galli while explaining their habit of revolting -  they have not broken fides, a 
would-be chieftain just seized power. This second aspect regarding divisions in Gallic 
society becomes clarified in the ethnography, with two aristocratic groups, the knights 
(equites) and the druids, discussed. The druids were the scholars, teachers, public 
authorities, and overseers of sacrifices, in essence the order generally inclined to 
respectable practices.175 His description of the second order, the knights, could be that ol 
the old warrior aristocracy, which was being displaced by a growing land-owning class. 
The only form of power they know is that derived from their body of retainers whom they
173 Caes. B Gall., 4.1,6.22-6.23. Specifics are added in Book Six, but much of the material is identical to 
descriptions o f the Suebi in Book Four.
174 Caes. B Gall., 5.12-5.14, transl. Carolyn Hammond, Oxford, 1996. “Civilized” includes both farming 
and trade (coinage).
175 Caes. B Gall., 6.13-6.14.
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lead into battle, an annual event prior to Caesar's coming.1™ There may be an implicit 
comparison with Ariovistus and ins belli in this description.
When Caesar appointed friendly leaders for local civitates, he chose the 
descendents of former rulers.1 7 It may be that the druids and pro-Roman landowners 
were closely associated classes. Prestige and economic wealth could reinforce each other 
as sources of power and influence, and both groups were similar enough to Rome’s own 
elite to compete within the frontier zone. This was advantageous to Rome, because 
both prestige and agriculture made a civitas secure and tractable through honors and 
trade, increasing Rome’s influence through her ability to support local elites. The only 
specifically mentioned druid, Diviciacus, was certainly prominent among the Aedui for 
Caesar’s favor, and Caesar again emphasizes Diviciacus’ appeal to the Senate against 
Ariovistus in the ethnography. Caesar likely intended that the Knights would be 
identified with those who had sacked Rome and invaded Italy in the fourth century. The 
Galli had become weaker because of the prominence of the less bellicose faction, but 
they had also become worthwhile allies.1 /9 The BG gives a much shorter description of
176 Caes. B Gall., 6.15.
177 It seems that this practice contributed to the revolt o f 54 B.C. A descendent o f an ancient ruler of the 
Carnutes, whom Caesar had “restored . . .  to the status o f his ancestors,” was killed. Also, the appointed 
ruler over the Senones was chased out. Indutiornarus had received Caesar’s public support, but material 
support went to his rival Cingetorix. Indutiornarus reacted badly, and the Treveri led the Eburones in 
unexpected rebellion. Caesar 5.25, 5.54. Caesar also claims (6.12) that his support allowed the Remi to 
supplant the Sequani as the second leading power of Gaul (the Aedui being the other).
178 The identification of pro and anti-Roman parties with native oligarchs/Republicans and “adventurers” 
(the would-be chieftains like Orgetorix) has not convinced everyone. Holmes, Caesar’s Conquest of Gaul, 
520-523. If one identifies Caesar’s druids with a land-owning/oligarchic faction, and the knights with the 
former aristocratic warrior class and their retainers, however, the BG seems to promote the former as 
worthwhile allies for Rome to maintain its dominant position among the Gallic civitates.
179 This weakness was relative. The frequent Gallic defeats and Caesar’s portrayal o f their leaders at the 
convention do not offer a flattering picture. On the other hand, after the revolt of Vercingetorix in 52 B.C. 
forces Caesar to conduct some difficulty and lengthy sieges, he concedes that they possessed considerable 
ability: “the Gajlli] used every kind of ingenuity to counter the extraordinary bravery of our soldiers. They7 7
the knights than the druids, indicating Caesar’s preference for the druids over the 
warriors. This preference regarding a class of society re-emphasizes that Caesar’s ethnic- 
divisions depended upon political relationships, that membership within a civitas was 
more meaningful than one’s genus, because the differences between the social classes 
lay, essentially, with their customs.
Caesar’s overarching goal was not to define Gaul or German in ethnic terms. He 
sought to strengthen Rome’s position within Gaul by drawing together as many 
communities as possible into the frontier system. This u'ould serve his own political 
interests as he could claim credit for defeating real or potential enemies and attaching 
additional communities to Rome through treaties and hostages, who would come to share 
the standards of the Roman aristocracy. The identity and habits of the peoples in the 
frontier zone mattered insofar as their political, social, and economic characteristics 
intersected to demonstrate humanitas. Other traits such as language, religion, and 
military virtue mattered in Roman perception for their ability to maintain a proper- 
community and, perhaps through patronage, for elevation within the political hierarchy.
Caesar’s Rhine policy initially created two camps based upon this hierarchy of
communities. The Gallic civitates deserved protection and inclusion, while the Germanic
chief Ariovistus did not. The characteristics that underscored their worth came more into
the foreground during Caesar’s return to the Rhine side of the frontier, from 55 to 53 B.C.
Lineage and other traits that determined what people were could be overwritten by the
memberships that determined who they were, and sustained contact with peoples on
either side of his proclaimed border caused Caesar to take this extra step. His eventual
are an extremely resourceful people [genus -  a variation on gens], and particularly talented at copying and 
putting into practice anything they are taught.” Caes. B Gall., 7.22.
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ethnography in Book Six would support the Rhine policy by demonstrating that the Galli 
had some degree of humanitas. Thus, the way in which peoples lived increased in 
significance as what had originated in a border dispute between the Sequani and 







This thesis has sought to outline an evolution in Julius Caesar’s use of the Rhine 
River during the Gallic Wars of 58 to 52 B.C. It has argued that Caesar first used the 
Rhine River as a political division between the Galli and the Germani, within the context 
of the concept of the frontier zone. Assuming the periodic composition of Caesar’s own 
narrative, the BG, this study then argued that a general Roman paradigm involving 
membership in political units and a shared value system expressed through a certain way 
of life further differentiated the two peoples at a later point in the conflict. This study has 
emphasized the BG over the Gallic Wars and sought to employ the text in a fashion 
consistent with its contemporary nature as a public document. In so doing, some broad 
characteristics that informed the Roman perception of foreign identity have appeared.
The traits include autochthony, a certain degree of social and political sophistication 
based on agriculture, and some defined relationship within the hierarchy of civitates 
which revolved around Rome. These characteristics became tied to Caesar’s use of the 
Rhine in the BG and thus were applied positively to the Galli and negatively to the 
Germani.
The evolution of the Rhine from legalistic boundary to culture barrier argued by 
this thesis depends upon the observations and generalizations contained within the BG.
As noted in the introduction, this study relies upon the theory of periodic composition,
80
according to which each book of the text was completed individually soon after the 
events recorded. The central point of this study has not been to demonstrate the 
likelihood of this process aside from the barest implications of proconsular habits, 
Caesar’s political interests, and Cicero’s letters. The changes in Caesar’s use of the 
Rhine from legalistic boundary to cultural barrier that have been argued would 
nevertheless demonstrate the lack of a complete plan or definitive use of the river at any 
one point within the text. So, in a limited sense, this paper presents supporting evidence 
for the periodic composition of the BG.
The first chapter of this study has focused on the Rhine River as a political 
boundary in the context of a threat to the frontier zone. Caesar adopted a policy that the 
Germani would not be allowed to enter Gaul. This chapter focused upon Book One, in 
which the Rhine appears as the border of one people’s territory, specifically that of the 
Sequani. Through the Sequani’s inclusion in frontier affairs, the Rhine was the finis of 
the frontier zone as a whole. The crossing of the Germani under Ariovistus brought an 
unaffiliated people into an area undergoing its own social and political changes. The 
failure of Ariovistus to adapt to the conventions of the frontier zone provided Caesar with 
the justification to repel the Germani from Gaul. The negative portrayal of this disruptive 
chieftain was the object of the second half of Book One. Since Ariovistus would not 
respect Rome’s central place, Caesar had every obligation to protect those who would, 
namely the Galli of Celtica. The Rhine serves as the territorial limit for this region and 
makes the identification of both the Galli and Germani immediately clear. This chapter 
also introduces the various senses in which Caesar speaks of Gaul, primarily as a large 
region that possessed distinct peoples (Acquitani, Galli, and Belgae) ethnically separate
81
through customs (laws, institutions, and language). The Galli had two identities, the 
regional one of living within Gaul, and the narrower one of living based on their ethnic 
divisions, such as Celtica. In either sense, the land of the Galli, Gallia, was bounded by 
the Rhine on its eastern side.
The second chapter focuses on the consequences of a second phase of Roman 
activity along the Rhine with a second group of Germani in Book Four. This phase of the 
Gallic Wars revolves around the defense of an expanded frontier zone that had extended 
along the Rhine’s entire length and amid peoples who were not the same relation to the 
Galli of the original zone. The interests of the BG shift from predominantly political 
identities reliant upon ties to Rome to an attempt to systematically outline cultural 
characteristics that determined humanitas, the customs assumed by the Roman 
aristocracy to denote civilization. The Rhine River received a new geographic status as it 
no longer just split states but also cultures. Caesar’s identification of the Galli and 
Germani in broad terms emphasized voluntary elements such as their customs and social 
structures, instead of determinative factors such as environment or lineage. The 
organization of politically unified groups (civitates) based on a public class involved in 
agriculture and trade became the standard to distinguish between Galli and Germani. The 
common structures underlying Caesar’s distinction by Book Six set the basis for the 
Rhine to become an ethnographic border, as increased involvement of peoples to its west 
in the Roman network would emphasize the values of the landowning class. This would 
in turn make the Galli effectively a separate people from the Germani.
The approach taken by this paper has downplayed Caesar’s own political career in 
Rome in that it views the Gallic Wars within the context of the frontier zone concept.
Admittedly, this approach minimizes some elements of Caesar's command, particularly 
the consequences of his prolonged campaigning in Rome's political arena. This was 
required by this paper’s focus on how Caesar perceived the inhabitants of the frontier, 
how he portrayed them in the EG, and, to some extent, what these portrayals indicate 
about how the Romans in general viewed these peoples. The broader dimensions of the 
Gallic Wars as a frontier conflict within the political theater of the Late Republic deserve 
further research. It is hoped that this study’s discussion of the characteristics of 
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